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ABSTRACT
This dissertation connects an idea of Europe, the Kantian idea of Europe, with public
opinion data measuring support for the EU. By the Kantian idea of Europe, I refer to the
idea of the EU as a federation of independent republics. I look at multiple dimensions of
support for the EU. The rst dimension is utilitarian. As the initial promise of the EU and
its predecessor institutions was largely economic, I check if public support for the EU is
contingent on economic performance and nd mixed support for my hypotheses. The
dimension I consider comes from revised modernization theory. I check and see if educa-
tion, interest in politics and postmaterialist values play a role in determining support for
the EU. Postmaterialists do support the EU more than materialists do, but stagnant levels
of materialism over the last three decades means that we cannot rely on value change to
provide support for the EU in the future. Next, I consider the minority nationalisms in
European nation-states which have long sought greater autonomy vis-à-vis the nation-
state. The EU was considered a vehicle for achieving this autonomy but its impact has
been limited at best. I also check if people who are from these regions seeking greater
autonomy are more supportive of the EU than others in their state. I nd that support
for this hypothesis is limited at best. Finally, I turn my attention to the creation of a Eu-
ropean identity in opposition to an ‘other’, namely the Muslim immigrant. The question
animating my analysis here is whether there is a nascent European nationalism which
sees itself in opposition to the Muslim ‘other’. My analysis shows that those who are
generally biased against immigrants do not support the EU. However, if we dierentiate
between immigrants from within the EU and those from outside the EU, there is much
more support for the former. This doesn’t necessarily mean that there will be an aective
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European identity, but does lead me to conclude that there exists a base for one. All my
analyses are conducted using data from the Eurobarometer and European Social Survey.





. . .what is true about today’s Europe may not be very new, and what is
proclaimed as new not perhaps wholly true.
Tony Judt
A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe
This dissertation concerns itself with the multiple dimensions of public support for
the European Union (EU). The EU itself exists because a collective idea of Europe as “a
political and cultural domain” exists (Pagden, 2002, p. 1). It is such an idea, one based
on peace and commerce, which I wish to explore further in this introduction. This is not
to say that other ideas of Europe don’t exist. They do, and one can convincingly argue
that the cultural unity of Europe comes from Christendom (Hay, 1968) or from war and
conquest (Pagden, 2002, p. 13) or as a product of the Cold War and in response to the Soviet
‘other’ (Neumann, 1999). The idea which I examine here comes from an enlightenment
narrative. It is the Kantian idea of Europe as a federation of republics and it has become a
normative standard—an ideal by which to judge forms of political association in Europe
and the world (Tully, 2002, p. 333).
1.1 The Kantian Idea of Europe
As Tully (2002, p. 333) mentions, the idea of Europe as a federation of independent
nations has functioned as a Kantian “regulative ideal” since the publication of Perpetual
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Peace in 1795.1 Kant, in his essay, outlines six preliminary articles (which lead to the con-
ditions for a perpetual peace among nations) and three denitive articles (which lead to
perpetual peace, formally instituted). It can be argued that the EU has fullled many of the
conditions laid out in Kant’s essay. The EU is a (con)federation of liberal democratic states,
thus fullling the requirements of the rst and second denitive articles. The third deni-
tive article, that of the cosmopolitan right of universal hospitality, is arguably fullled by
the free movement of people within the EU. Moreover, EU itself is brought together by
commerce and trade with a single market and single currency. For Kant, this ‘spirit of
commerce’ is necessary because he saw it as antithetical to war (Kant, 1991, p. 114). And
importantly, this reliance on commerce provides a means to ensure compliance within the
federation without a resort to war.
There are three additional features of this idea of Europe which bear further discus-
sion. The rst is that Europe and the EU serve as models for the political organization of
all the nations of the world (Tully, 2002, p. 332). This idea of perpetual peace is not limited
to Europe but aims to encompass the whole world (Kant, 1991, p. 104). Yet again Europe is
seen to be on the forefront of development; it is forging a path which the rest of the world
will follow. Second, the spread of this form of political organization across the world is
understood “as the consequence of a set of historical processes and ‘stages’ of world de-
velopment, including the spread of commerce and the rule of law by European wars of
imperial expansion” (Tully, 2002, p. 332). The idea of the ‘stages’ of world development is
present in Kant’s essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent. For Kant,
history itself works towards nature’s highest purpose, namely a universal cosmopolitan
existence for all mankind (Kant, 1991, p. 51). Finally, for Pagden (1995), the publication
of Perpetual Peace marks the transition from the idea of Europe as ‘empire’ to the idea of
Europe as ‘federation’.
This Kantian idea of Europe remains relevant to this day (Pagden, 2002; Tully, 2002;
1All references to Perpetual Peace are from Kant’s Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss (1991).
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Fontana, 2002). The EU and its predecessor institutions were created with the aim of
preventing another war between the European states, particularly France and Germany.
By this measure alone, the EU has been a spectacular success. Trade and commerce were
the tools used to achieve this aim and the EU has successfully created a common European
market which allows the free movement of goods and people. Hence, Kant’s ‘spirit of
commerce’ has achieved the desired result: the prevention of war. The EU members are
all liberal democratic states; indeed it is a requirement for gaining membership to the
union. For Kant, it was important that the nations in this federation retain their national
character; Kant opposed the idea of an international state (Kant, 1991, p. 102). As of now,
the EU does fulll this requirement though many see it as being well on its way to a supra-
national state. It is for these reasons I argue that the idea animating the EU is the Kantian
Idea outlined in Perpetual Peace.
This dissertation is not a theoretical inquiry into the Kantian Idea of Europe. Rather,
this idea serves as the premise for an empirical inquiry into public support for the EU. As
I have mentioned above, all the member states of the EU are liberal democracies; that is
the basis for their legitimacy. By extension, the EU itself derives its legitimacy from the
citizens of its member states. If this was not previously obvious, it has been made so by
Brexit. The very survival of the union—and by extension the Kantian Idea of Europe—is
contingent on public support for it.
Throughout this dissertation I aim to show that the Kantian idea is not a useful frame
of reference for analyzing Europe.2 That it has been used in the past is not reason to use it
going forward. For Kant, the federation of republics was to be a rather loose institutional
arrangement without strong enforcement powers. This is clearly not the case of the EU
now. My argument is that the EU is trending towards a supranational state, a European
nation-state if you will, and that a Burkean framework is much more useful in order to
analyze this kind of political structure.
2Hence the title of this dissertation: Requiem for an Idea.
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1.2 Plan for the Dissertation
I analyze public support for the EU using publicly available survey data. I limit my
inquiry to the EU15 countries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. I choose the EU15 states for two reasons. First, there is an extensive
time-series survey data available for these countries since at least 1995. And second, in-
cluding these countries increases the dierences between countries in the analysis. The
EU15 countries show a number of dierences and with the addition of the Eastern Euro-
pean member states, the amount of heterogeneity increases, thus making interpretation
of the statistical analysis harder. The Eurobarometer surveys have been conducted bi-
annually in member countries since 1973 and they form the basis of my inquiry. Chapter
two develops measures of public support based on questions asked in the Eurobarometer
surveys. I start the chapter by developing a theoretical framework for the analysis of pub-
lic support for the EU. This is largely based on the frameworks developed by David Easton
(1965) and Fritz Scharpf (1999). I dierentiate between two dimensions of public support
(specic and diuse) and then go on to apply them to the measures of public support for
the EU. The chapter concludes with a graphical description of these measures. I present
and discuss the time-series of these variables which is separated by country. This allows
us to see the dierent dynamics of support in each of the EU15 states.
Chapter three connects instrumental public support with economic indicators. The
argument here is that the initial promise of the EU was largely economic and so pub-
lic support for the EU should vary with economic outcomes. I start the chapter with a
discussion of the neofunctionalist theory of integration and from this derive my basic hy-
pothesis that stronger GDP growth, lower unemployment and ination, and more trade
with EU countries will lead to more support for the EU. After this, I turn to a discussion
of the post-functionalist theory of Hooghe and Marks (2008) which contends we cannot
take public support for granted following the post-Maastricht politicization of the inte-
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gration process. From this theory I derive the hypothesis that the explanatory power of
economic indicators in predicting public support has decreased following the Maastricht
Treaty. These hypotheses are tested using xed-eects regression on panel data. I also
conduct individual country regressions to test these hypotheses in each country. The
results show mixed support for the hypotheses.
The next chapter focuses on revised modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997) in the con-
text of European integration. Modernization theory ts in quite well with the idea of
‘stages’ of world development. The main idea behind it is that economic development
leads to political change and, theoretically, a move towards democracy. For the revised
version of modernization theory, this relationship is mediated by a change in values at
the individual and societal levels. I relate this revised version of modernization theory to
European integration and derive two main hypotheses from this discussion. The rst is
related to cognitive mobilization, namely that rising levels of education will allow more
people to identify with a larger political community (the EU). I test if those with higher
educational levels and a higher interest in political issues are more supportive of the EU.
The second hypothesis is related to value change. Individuals with postmaterialist values
(those prioritizing freedom and autonomy) are hypothesized to be more supportive of the
EU. I test both hypotheses using mixed-eects logistic regression analysis, the rst with
Eurobarometer data and the second with data from the World Values Survey / European
Values Survey. The results conrm both the hypotheses, though the lack of an increase in
the relative number of postmaterialists in the last thirty years leads me to the conclusion
that we must look to other sources of support for the EU.
The next two chapters look at nationalism and its role in aecting public opinion about
the EU. Chapter ve discusses minority nationalist movements in the age of the union.
If the EU is to be a federation of peoples, support for the EU must come from all these
nationalities within the EU. The great promise of the EU for minority nations (periphery)
within existing European nation-states (center) is that it provides a path by which they
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can achieve increasing autonomy. Hence, we would expect those living in the periphery
to be more supportive of the EU as compared to those living in the center. We would also
expect regionalist parties, as a party family, to be more supportive of the EU. In order to
test these hypotheses, I discuss the response of regionalist parties towards the EU in three
countries: Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom. I then analyze public opinion data
from these three countries and compare levels of dierent measures of public support in
the center and periphery. The results show that with the exception of the United Kingdom,
there is no pattern of signicantly higher public support in the periphery as opposed to
the center. Hence, we cannot expect the center-periphery conict to provide signicant
support to the EU. I discuss the analysis of the United Kingdom in the context of Brexit
and ask if the center-periphery conict could have actually provided the last few votes
that were needed to get the UK out of the EU.
Chapter six discusses the formation of a nascent European nationalism and the con-
struction of a European identity. My discussion of this revolves around the construction
of ‘self’ as opposed to an ‘other’. In the European context, I identify and discuss two of
the latter: the American ‘other’ and the Muslim immigrant ‘other’. While there is a long
history of analyzing the creation of a European ‘self’ in opposition to America (which I
discuss in the chapter) the lack of survey data makes it hard to empirically connect the
two. Hence, my empirical analysis is limited to the opposition to the immigrant. Using
European Social Survey data, I show that those with negative attitudes towards immi-
grants and immigration say that European integration should not go further. This is not
really surprising and is in line with past research on the topic. However, this analysis (and
most past research on this subject) does not dierentiate between immigrants from within
the EU and those from outside (Muslims). The next part of my analysis in this chapter is a
rst step in doing that. As the EU has opened up borders and allowed the free movement
of people, the EU15 countries have seen a signicant increase in immigration from other
EU countries. Hence, most immigration is from within the EU, even if the perception
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remains of the quintessential immigrant being Muslim. I show that there are signicant
dierences in if people view immigrants favorably depending on if the immigrants are
from the EU or from outside. This dierence holds regardless of whether respondents
identify as exclusively European, exclusively national, or say that they identify with both
Europe and the nation.
Finally, the conclusion discusses the results of my empirical analyses and relates them
back to the Kantian idea of Europe I have discussed in this introduction. The big ques-
tion driving my empirical analyses has been whether European public opinion can lend
support to this Kantian idea of Europe. If it cannot, my contention is not that the EU will
(completely) disintegrate. Rather that we might then be moving towards a more Burkean
idea of Europe, the idea that the EU is becoming a nation-state. I end my dissertation with




This chapter describes the measures of public support used in the analyses that fol-
low. However, before describing the data and the measures I have chosen, I describe the
theoretical reasoning behind this choice. Towards this end, the next section lays out the
theoretical framework of public support which was rst outlined by David Easton and
then relates it to the measures of support for the EU. In the following section, I explore
the data graphically so that we can get a good sense of how support has changed over
time for a given country in the EU15.
2.1 A Theoretical Framework
The analysis in this dissertation follows a long line of previous research in adopt-
ing David Easton’s theoretical framework for the analysis of public support for European
integration (Niedermayer and Westle, 1995; Reif, Inglehart and Rabier, 1991; Gabel, 1998;
Shepherd, 1975). One reason that they use the Eastonian model is that it allows them to
specify various dimensions of public support. According to Easton (1965), both demands
and support serve as inputs to a political system. Support serves as the input to three
objects in this system: a) the political community where the members of the system are
seen as a group of people bound together (1965, p. 177), b) the regime, which is the set of
institutions (values, norms, and structure of authority) which comprises the system (1965,
8
p. 193), and c) those who occupy the authority roles in the system (1965, p. 212). Support
itself is divided into specic and diuse. Specic support is a consequence of the fulll-
ment of demands that members make on a political system (1965, p. 268). While this kind
of support is most easily measured by looking at approval levels and economic outcomes,
it is not necessarily limited to this. Specic support could also be generated due to specic
policies on environmental issues, democratic performance, and disarmament. However
specic support by itself is insucient because no political system could withstand long
periods where the demands of members were not satised (Easton, 1965, p. 269). Hence
the need for diuse support which forms a ‘reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will’
that helps members cope with adverse outcomes (Easton, 1965, p. 273). A large amount
of diuse support is necessary during trying political and economic conditions: members
are happy to support a political system which satises their wants but are considerably
less likely to support a system which does not do so. Diuse support becomes necessary
during such times as it signies an ‘attachment to a political object for its own sake’ (Eas-
ton, 1965, p. 274). As such, it goes beyond economic rationality and is associated with
legitimacy towards a particular regime or authority, a ‘dedication to a common interest,
or identication with a political community’ (Easton, 1965, p. 343). As Easton makes clear
in a later re-assessment of the two kinds of support, specic support is ‘directed towards
political authorities and authoritative institutions’ (1975, p. 439). This assumes that the
members of the political system can connect outputs to the performance of authorities.
Also, it assumes a political culture exists where members can hold authorities accountable
for their performance. If these assumptions are met, then specic support will vary with
perceived benets gained from the system (1975, p. 439).
A similar concern with these two types of public support is present in the work of Fritz
Scharpf. According to Scharpf, the issues of democracy and legitimacy involves two per-
spectives: an input-oriented democracy where political decisions are legitimate if ‘they
can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community,’ and an
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output perspective where political choice are legitimate if they ‘eectively promote the
common welfare of the constituency in question’ (1999, p. 6).1 This latter perspective is
interest-based rather than identity-based and is derived from the ‘capacity to solve prob-
lems requiring collective solutions because they could not be solved through individual
actions, through market exchanges, or through voluntary cooperation in society’ (1999,
p. 11). In other words, the output perspective points us towards the view that support for
institutions comes from their ability to solve collective problems and thus corresponds
nicely with specic support. The input perspective, where political decisions are an ex-
pression of the preferences of community members, requires the existence of a “thick”
collective identity among its constituents. According to Scharpf, this is necessary in or-
der to prevent the tyranny of the majority; it is when belief in a “thick” collective identity
is taken for granted that majority rule loses its threatening character (1999, p. 8). In Eas-
tonian terms, the argument that Scharpf is making here is that the presence of diuse
support is necessary in the absence of specic support (even if it is to prevent the tyranny
of the majority).
2.1.1 Measures of EU Support
Segatti and Westle (2016) take the Eastonian model of support for a political system
and apply it to the European context. They divide diuse support into the three subdi-
mensions of legitimacy, mutuality (belonging together) and identication (belonging to).
In their framework, the subdimension of legitimacy captures evaluative attitudes towards
the present and future existence of the political community (Segatti and Westle, 2016, p.
23). The measures which capture this subdimension are a) membership: do you think
that our country’s membership in the EU is a good thing or a bad thing; b) deepening:
do you think that integration had already gone too far or not far enough, and; c) widen-
1I should mention here that both these perspectives can, and often do, work simultaneously in a democ-
racy. It is also helpful to think of the input-oriented democracy as a Rousseauian vision of a republic ani-
mated by a general will. Output-oriented democracy is much closer to the Madisonian ideal type.
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ing: are you in favor or against the widening of the EU. The subdimension of mutuality
looks at trust towards others within the community and the denition of outsiders and
insiders. The subdimension of identication is divided into a cognitive identication with
the community along with the knowledge and salience of the EU in people’s lives. This
subdimension also includes an aective component. This is operationalized as a question
which asks respondents if they see themselves belonging the the nation-state only, to the
nation-state and Europe, to Europe and the nation-state, or to Europe only (Segatti and
Westle, 2016, p.24). Another subdimension of diuse support not discussed by Segatti and
Westle (2016) is that of trust in the EU institutions. I add this dimension to capture how
much respondents trust the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC)
and the European Central Bank (ECB). For specic support, Segatti and Westle (2016, p.
24) suggest the use of the variable which asks respondents if their country has, on balance,
betted from being a member of the EU.
2.2 Operationalizing the Measures
The analyses in the dissertation primarily use the Eurobarometer surveys in order to
measure public support for the EU. The Eurobarometer surveys are public opinion surveys
conducted semi-annually in the EU (and more recently the EU candidate countries) in
order to measure public opinion on a wide range of issues. The surveys started in 1973 and
continue until the present day and are conducted on behalf of the European Commission.
As the EU expanded to include more member countries, these countries were subsequently
included in the survey. Hence this survey provides the largest time-series for conducting
any analyses on public opinion in Europe. The data from 1973 to 2002 were combined in
the Mannheim trend le (Schmitt and Scholz, 2005). For the purposes of this dissertation,
I have extended the Mannheim Trend le to include the surveys conducted between 2002
and 2016. That is I have added the individual Eurobarometer les from EB 58 to EB 86 to the
Mannheim trend le. In this dissertation I analyze public opinion in the fteen Western
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European countries of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and
Austria. The graphs below show how each variable under consideration has changed
over time in each of these fteen countries.
Figure 2.1 shows how the measure of specic support (has your country beneted from
being a member of the EU) has changed over time in each of the fteen countries under
consideration. The graph is constructed using weighted Eurobarometer data and shows
the percentage of respondents who say their country has beneted from being a member
of the EU. An cursory glance at the graph tells us that the levels of support and the trend
over times varies considerably by country. This level of specic support for the EU in
Ireland is, and has been, very high while it has declined in Greece since the introduction
of the Euro. In Italy it has been declining since the early 1990s while Spain and Portugal
have experienced some sharp declines in the late 2000s due to the nancial crisis. In
Sweden and Finland the level has been increasing since the late 1990s while it has stayed
constant in Austria.
The next graph shows what Segatti and Westle (2016) considers a measure of diuse
support. Figure 2.2 gives the percentage of respondents who say that their country’s mem-
bership in the EU is a good thing. As a measure of diuse support, it should theoretically
be more stable than measures of specic support. However, we see that the trend mirrors
gure 2.1 which shows the percentage who say that their country has beneted from the
EU. This brings into question if this indeed is a measure of diuse support. It isn’t as sta-
ble as a measure of diuse support should theoretically be and as is seen in the chart, the
countries hardest hit by the nancial crisis have seen the largest declines in this measure.
Given this, it makes sense to treat this measure as an indicator of specic support.
The next trend I consider is a newer one which started in 2002. It asks respondents
about their image of the EU. Responses are recorded on a ve point scale going from ‘Very
Positive’ to ‘Neutral’ to ‘Very Negative’. Figure 2.3 shows the percentage of respondents
12
Figure 2.1: Percentage who say that their country has on balance beneted from being a
member of the EU.
who have a positive image of the EU. The time-series goes from 2002 to 2016 and shows a
declining trends across all countries besides Finland and Sweden. Since the introduction of
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Figure 2.2: Percentage who say that their country’s membership in the EU is a good thing.
the Euro and especially since the global nancial crisis, the percentage of those who view
the EU positively has been declining. In the United Kingdom, less than 40% of respondents
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Figure 2.3: Percentage who have a positive image of the EU.
have a positive image of the EU.
The next three gures show the levels of trust in EU institutions. Figures 2.5, 2.4
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Figure 2.4: Percentage who say that they tend to trust the European Parliament.
and 2.6 show the level of trust in the European Commission, European Parliament and
the European Central Bank. The gures show that in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal
16
trust in EU institutions is at very low levels. Trust has also been declining in Germany
and France and to a lesser extent in Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria. In the United
Kingdom, trust in EU institutions has always been at quite a low level.
Finally, gure 2.7 shows responses to the question about national versus European
identity. The Eurobarometer question asks respondents if they identify with the nation
only, the nation and Europe, Europe and then the nation or Europe only. The gure shows
the percentage of respondents who have a mixed or European identity. We see that the
trends are more stable and don’t change as much with changes in economic conditions
such as the recent economic and migrant crises. This is a more stable measure of support
and of identication with Europe as opposed to the EU. Hence it makes sense to consider
this a measure of diuse support. In many countries the trend is increasing as more people
come to see themselves as European rather than as exclusively national.
These trends present a troubling picture for the EU as an institution. We see that since
2000, trust in key EU institutions has been declining across most countries. As the EU
institutions have come to have a larger presence in the daily lives of EU residents, the
institutions themselves are losing legitimacy. However, while this is happening, identi-
cation with Europe, as opposed to the EU, is rising in most countries. There is certainly a
strong cohort eect here as more and more people come of age in a post Cold War Europe
where the free movement of goods and people is the norm. This points to the creation of
a nascent aective European identity which, as I contend in this dissertation, will be nec-
essary if the project of European integration is to prosper. The UK remains an exception
in this trend as around 60% of residents see themselves as exclusively national and there
has been virtually no trend towards a growing European identity. This goes a long way
in explaining why the Brexit vote succeeded.
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Figure 2.5: Percentage who say that they tend to trust the European Commission.
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Figure 2.6: Percentage who say that they tend to trust the European Central Bank.
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Utilitarian Support for the EU
This chapter looks at the relationship between changes in public support for the EU
and changes with economic conditions. A cursory examination of the data in the previous
chapter showed that support did indeed decrease in the countries worst aected by the
economic crisis in the late 2000s.
3.1 Connecting the dots: The contribution of Neofunctionalism
The work of Ernst B. Haas, the founder of neofunctionalism, links the concepts of
specic and diuse support to the case of European integration. Neofunctionalist theo-
ries trace their lineage to the economic integration theories of Bela Balassa (1961) and Jan
Tinbergen (1954). Balassa’s model is one of economic determinism: once member states
choose the path of economic integration there is, as such, no going back and economic de-
pendence in one area triggers integration in another. In this model, the rst phase would
involve ‘negative integration’, namely the removal of internal taris, the establishment
of a common external tari and the removal of barriers to the free movement of capital
and labor. The next phase, that of ‘positive integration’, would lead to the harmonization
of social and economic policies, a monetary and scal union, and nally, political inte-
gration (Buonanno and Nugent, 2011, pp. 15–17). Neofunctionalism shares the economic
determinism of Balassa’s integration theory; both predict that integration in one area will
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‘spill over’ into other areas and will eventually lead to political spillover.
Yet, for Haas, the move towards a political union was mediated by more than just eco-
nomic spillover. Haas dened political integration as ‘the process whereby political actors
in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and
political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction
over the pre-existing national states’ (1958, p. 16). It is the part about ‘shifting loyalties’
which has been interpreted by Thomas Risse (2005, p. 292) to be a statement about col-
lective identity formation. Following this line of reasoning, for Haas public identication
with EU institutions is an integral part of the process of political integration.1 But how
will this occur? By what mechanism will the public be “persuaded” to identify with the
new institutions? To this, Haas gives us three answers (1958, p. 14). First, the new loyalties
may be valued as ends in themselves. Second, they may develop due to pressure of con-
formity. Finally, and most importantly for integration theorists, new loyalties can come
about if groups and individuals cannot realize their goals within a national framework
and so must turn to the supranational institutions. Elaborating on this last mechanism,
Haas states that political loyalties are a function of an individual’s satisfaction with the
institution’s performance of crucial functions. And as international organizations will be
performing these crucial functions, a transfer of personal loyalty to these institutions is
likely (1964, pp. 49–50).
In this chapter, my focus is not so much on the mechanism by which specic support
leads to diuse support. Rather, I am concerned about the existence of specic support
for the European integration project itself. This brings about the question of how we
measure the EU’s performance. On one level, the EU has been spectacularly successful—
as the founders of the EU intended, it (and its predecessor institutions) have eliminated
the possibility of war between member states. The way in which this goal was achieved
was through the creation of economic institutions which bound these countries together.
1Crucially, these shifting loyalties need not mean the end of national loyalties as Haas (1958, p. 14)
mentions that multiple loyalties can exist for an individual.
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In large part, the promise of the EU has been an improvement in domestic economic
and trade outcomes (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998). Hence, neofunctionalist
assumptions can be tested by looking at the relationship between public support for the
EU and national economic and trade performance. According to neofunctionalism, better
economic performance should translate to greater public support for the EU.2 This leads
to my rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Public support for the integration project, in the EU as a whole,
will vary with domestic economic and trade performance.
Neofunctionalist theory does not account for important national dierences. For example,
we know that support for integration has traditionally been low in the United Kingdom
and much higher in Germany. These dierences are treated as exogenous for the purposes
of neofunctionalist theory. Instead, the theory predicts that regardless of the base level of
support in each country, changes in support should reect the performance of European
institutions. Thus, the prediction is that economic performance can account for some
of the variation in public support for integration and that the logic of this relationship
remains the same across all countries. This leads me to two related hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Domestic economic and trade performance will explain some
of the variance in public support in all countries.
Hypothesis 2b: The trend that better domestic economic and trade performance
will lead to greater support will remain the same in all countries.
3.2 The Postfunctionalist Challenge
As we have seen, Haas’ economic determinism was tempered somewhat by his atten-
tion to identity. Yet, this aspect of the theory was largely ignored by the neofunctionalist
2Whether or not this support translates to a ‘shift in loyalties’ from the nation to the EU is an empirical
question which I will not explore in this paper.
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and intergovernmentalist debates in the following three decades (Risse, 2005, p. 294). It
is only since the 1990s that issues related to a European identity have become the focus of
sustained academic debate. It is within this debate that Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks
(2008) have proposed a postfunctionalist theory of European integration. The functional-
ism in ‘postfunctionalism’ corresponds to the view ‘that regional integration is triggered
by a mismatch between eciency and the existing structure of authority’. The ‘post’
comes from the fact that the outcome of the integration process will be contingent on
political conict which engages communal identities (2008, p. 2). Economic interests
alone do not underly preferences over Europe; rather it is identity and economic interests
together. Hence, postfunctionalist theory aims to shed the economic determinism of neo-
functionalism and tries to explain the structure of political conict surrounding European
integration.
It is signicant that this postfunctionalist theory marks the time of the Maastricht
Treaty as a break from the past. Using Lindberg and Scheingold’s (1970) concept of ‘per-
missive consensus’, Hooghe and Marks (2008, p. 5) argue that the years leading up to the
Maastricht Treaty were ones characterized by this consensus as most of the public was
agnostic towards the integration process; European integration simply did not aect their
lives much. On the other hand, the period since the Maastricht Treaty has been described
by them as one of ‘constraining dissensus’ as European issues began to engage the mass
public. By ‘constraining dissensus’, Hooghe and Marks refer to politicization of the in-
tegration process—this issue is no longer one of low salience for the public. It does not
necessarily mean the rise of a Eurosceptic public; rather, it simply refers to the notion that
European elites will no longer be able to ignore public opinion on this issue as they had
done in the past. Increased salience does not automatically lead to the politicization of
an issue. For that to occur, the presence of political entrepreneurs who can construct the
issue in the political sphere is necessary (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, p. 13).
In Hooghe and Marks’ model, the issue of European integration can be constructed in
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the domestic politics of a country on an economic or non-economic left/right dimension
(Hooghe and Marks, 2008, pp. 14–17). The economic left/right dimension would consist
of two broad coalitions, one supporting ‘social market capitalism’ and pushing for market
correcting measures at the European level, while the other would have a‘ Europe-wide
deregulated market’ as its goal. Yet, this Europe-wide economic left/right debate is dier-
ent from the national left/right debate in that redistribution from rich to poor would mean
large amounts of inter-country scal transfers from the richer north to the poorer south
and east. This debate also brings up a non-economic left/right dimension which, accord-
ing to Hooghe and Marks (2008, p. 16) ranges from green/alternative/libertarian (gal) to
traditionalism/authority/nationalism (tan) parties. On one side of the spectrum, there is a
weaker association between the gal parties and support for European integration because
this goes along with market liberalization. Notwithstanding this, Green parties have come
around to supporting the idea of a multi-cultural European society (Hooghe and Marks,
2008, p. 17). This was exemplied by the German Green party’s support for the expansion
of the European Financial Stability Facility(EFSF), a bail-out mechanism for the Euro. The
same issue also brought out the dilemma facing moderate tan parties such as the ruling
German coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Socialist Union
(CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) as the main opposition to the expansion of the
EFSF came from the CDU’s coalition partners. These parties oppose European integration
because it erodes national sovereignty and yet this opposition is tempered by a commit-
ment to liberal economic policies espoused by the EU. However, for the more radical tan
parties, also known as populist radical right parties, no such conicts exist. These par-
ties, such as the Austrian Freedom Party and the French National Front, are anti-system
parties (Ignazi, 2003, p. 212) which, while not overtly calling for an end to democracy,
do actively espouse an anti-liberal democratic agenda (Mudde, 2007, p. 155). They are
extremely nationalistic in their worldview and their discourse is highly anti-immigrant
and xenophobic, yet, they have made a clean break from the fascist past and now most of
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the new radical right parties actively dissociate themselves from fascism (Ignazi, 2003, p.
195). That they are a product of the postindustrial revolution should not be in question as
economics is no longer the primary issue of the party family (Mudde, 2007, p. 136).
Postfunctionalist theory posits that the process of integration will be increasingly me-
diated by public opinion on this issue. But how does postfunctionalist theory t into the
Eastonian framework I have developed above? According to postfunctionalism, during
the phase of ‘negative integration’ (the removal of internal taris, the creation of a com-
mon external tari, and the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, labor, and
capital) specic support would depend on the benet community members were able to
derive from the EU institutions. After the Maastricht Treaty, the phase of ‘positive in-
tegration’ begins and there is a transfer of competencies from the nation to the EU. It is
during this phase that diuse support for the national political community will begin to
impinge on the specic support derived from better economic outcomes. Hence, post-
functionalist theory predicts that domestic economic and trade outcomes will explain less
of the variance in public support for the EU after the Maastricht Treaty. However, in or-
der to become politically salient, opposition to integration needs the presence of political
entrepreneurs. Here, the radical right parties serve this purpose and so we would expect
that in countries with strong radical right parties, the utilitarian relationship between the
economy and public support will be even more tenuous. This leads me to the next two
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: The post-Maastricht period (post-1992) shows a decline in the
change in public support explained by domestic economic and trade indicators.
Hypothesis 3b: In the post-Maastricht period, economic and trade factors ex-
plain public support less in countries with strong radical right parties than in
countries without these parties.
Now that I have a good set of hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework, I
would like to lay out the plan for the rest of the chapter. In the next section I review
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some past analyses of utilitarian support for European integration, outlining along way
the similarities and dierences these analyses share with my own. After that, I take a rst
look at the data with which I will test out the hypotheses given above. Finally, I go right
into the actual analysis itself, accompanied by a discussion of the results.
3.3 On Specic Support: A literature review
My study is hardly the rst to analyze the utilitarian basis for EU support. However, in
spite of the many similarities that my analysis shares with those reviewed below, there are
two dierences which stand out. First, all these studies (including mine) use data from the
Eurobarometer surveys but given the bi-annual nature of the surveys, I have a much larger
dataset to work with. This leads to the second dierence: the data allows me to conduct
separate regression analyses for each EU member state. Having said that, the studies my
own analysis is most indebted to are those conducted by Richard Eichenberg and Russel
Dalton (1993; 2007). In their rst analysis, they investigate the relationship between eco-
nomic factors (GDP growth, ination, unemployment, trade, and EU transfers) and public
support for the EU. In addition to economic factors, they also investigate the relationship
between various political factors and public support for the EU. Their conclusion is that
both of these factors are important in explaining public support—specically, good eco-
nomic conditions lead to greater public support for the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993).
Revisiting their analysis a decade and a half later, Eichenberg and Dalton nd that while
economic factors continue to inuence public support, this inuence is much weaker in
the post-1992 time period. In their study, the move towards a monetary union triggered a
public concern with the transfer of resources between member countries. Hence, they nd
that even though economic variables continue to matter, they do so at a lower intensity
(Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007).
Another study of utilitarian support comes from Matthew Gabel (1998). Gabel develops
an Eastonian model with which he links utilitarian and aective support. The conclusion
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of his study on utilitarian support is that this support varies systematically with the eco-
nomic benets individuals obtain from the liberalization of the capital, goods, and labor
markets (Gabel, 1998, p. 55). The level of intra-EU trade remains a strong predictor of
public support in Gabel’s model. Related to this, Anderson and Reichert (1995) conduct a
cross-national analysis of public support for integration and nd that support also varies
with how much benet people can derive from unication. Citizens of countries which
benet more from EU trade and budget transfer show higher levels of support, as do citi-
zens who would individually benet from market liberalization. Similarly, Anderson and
Kaltenthaler (1996) nd that favorable domestic economic conditions and length of mem-
bership in the union all lead to greater public support. Finally, a more recent study by
Isernia et al. (2012) looks at both utilitarian and identity-based determinants of support
for integration. Surprisingly, they nd that public support is greater in countries where
the economy is more developed, during poor economic times, when governance is poor,
and when immigration is low (2012, p. 129). They also nd that the salience of economic
variables in explaining public support has not decreased over time.
As this short review of the existing literature has shown, there is no broad agreement
in how economic variables inuence public support. It is keeping these studies in mind
that I now begin my own analyses.
3.4 The Data
As stated above, my main aim in this paper is to look at the relationship between eco-
nomic outcomes and public support for the EU. As a measure of utilitarian (specic) sup-
port, I take responses to the following question from the Eurobarometer surveys: “Gener-
ally speaking, do you think (your country’s) membership in the Union is a good thing, a
bad thing, or neither good nor bad?" Following Eichenberg and Dalton (1993; 2007), I con-
struct the net support of a given country at a given time by subtracting the percentage
those who answered ‘a bad thing’ from the percentage of those who answered ‘a good
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thing’. One advantage of using this question is that with a couple of exceptions, it has
been asked bi-annually from 1973 to 2011. Hence, I get a large time-series with 74 data
points for each country where all the data is available. The entire series (from 1973 to
2011) is available for Belgium, Denmark, France, (West) Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands and the UK. It is available from 1980 for Greece, from 1985 for Spain
and Portugal, from 1993 for Finland and from 1994 for Austria and Sweden.
In order to capture domestic economic and trade performance, I have used the common
metrics of GDP,3 unemployment rate,4 ination rate,5 and the export ratio6 of a country’s
exports to the EU countries to its exports to the world. Quarterly economic data is used
(specically, the second and fourth quarters) in order match the timing of the Eurobarom-
eter surveys.
Looking at the evolution of aggregate net support from 1973 to 2011 as shown in gure
3.1, there are two things which stand out. First, that the increase in net support in the
1980’s was followed by a large drop in the 1990’s. At rst glance this lends some support
to the postfunctionalist thesis. Secondly, the start of the eurozone crisis in the late 200’s
has seen a large drop in net support. After a quick look at gure 3.2, we see a more nuanced
picture emerging. This gure shows net support by ascension group. Looking at this, we
can see that the large drop in the 1990’s was caused in large part due to the inclusion
of Austria, Finland, and Sweden which have a lower level of base support. However, a
downward trend in net support amongst the EU5 countries is also noticeable after 1990.
Does this mean that the postfunctionalist thesis is correct? I use regression analyses in
order to test this and the other hypotheses in the next section.
3I have taken the GDP Index with 2010 as the base year. In all the regressions, I use the rst-dierence of
this variable in order to reduce problems associated with stationarity. Source: OECD (N.d.) Main Economic
Indicators.
4Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators and Eurostat, European Commission (N.d.).
5Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators.
6Source: IMF (N.d.), Direction of Trade Statistics.
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate Net Support for the EU (EU15 countries)
Figure 3.2: Aggregate Net Support for the EU (EU15 countries)
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3.5 Analyses & Discussion
For analyzing this data, I have used multivariate regression on unbalanced panel data
for analyses which require pooling of countries. The xed-eects models correct for het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation. For the individual country analyses, I have used or-
dinary least-squares regression.
Table 3.1: EU15 Panel Regressions: Dependent variable is Net Support.
Full Panel Pre 1993 Post 1992
Estimate Estimate Estimate
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
GDP 1.202 0.5332 0.175
( 0.775) ( 0.538) ( 0.535)
Ination -0.003 -0.0093* 0.0052
( 0.006) ( 0.004) ( 0.006)
Unemployment -0.0133* -0.005 -0.0099
( 0.006) ( 0.003) ( 0.006)
Export Ratio 0.3775 1.1944* 0.7909*
( 0.418) ( 0.341) ( 0.282)
N 875 359 500
AdjustedR2 0.0704 0.3123 0.088
* p ≤ 0.05
A quick look at table 3.1 shows poor support for my rst hypothesis. The panel regres-
sion using all the data shows that economic factors explain very little variance in public
support. Except for the export ratio, none of the factors are signicant. Breaking up the
data into two sets (pre 1993 and post 1992) paints a slightly dierent picture. The pre-1993
data shows strong support for the neofunctionalist thesis with economic factors explain-
ing 31% of the variance. However, post 1992 data does not show the same relationship. In
fact, this table suggests a preliminary support for the post-functionalist thesis (hypothesis
three). However, besides the change in politicization which occurred post 1992 (as post-
functionalism posits), the other big change in the data was the addition of Austria, Finland
and Sweden in the mid-1990s. Prior to this, there was the addition of Spain and Portugal
in the mid-80s. Hence it might be that the addition of these countries is changing the
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relationship between economic outcomes and public support. It could be possible that in
countries for which we have the full series (from 1973 to 2011), economic variables could
still explain public support well. In order to test this, I repeated the above analysis for the
eight countries for which I have a complete series (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and, UK). The results of this analysis are presented in table
3.2. The results are quite similar to table one. A balanced panel regression on all the data
shows no signicant relationship between the economic variables and public support. A
strong relationship exists between the two prior to 1993 but disappears after that. All of
this lends support to the postfunctionalist thesis.
Table 3.2: EU8 Panel Regressions (includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, and UK
Full Panel Pre 1993 Post 1992
Estimate Estimate Estimate
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
GDP 1.654 0.4155 0.2787
( 1.089) ( 0.598) ( 0.721)
Ination -0.0052 -0.0114* 0.0176
( 0.008) ( 0.005) ( 0.012)
Unemployment -0.0119 -0.0088* 0.0063
( 0.009) ( 0.003) ( 0.011)
Export Ratio 0.0669 0.9822* 0.8041*
( 0.541) ( 0.434) ( 0.351)
N 550 270 268
AdjustedR2 0.0659 0.2838 0.0685
* p ≤ 0.05
Moving on to individual country analyses, the results of the regressions are presented
in tables 3.3 and 3.4. A quick look at the results shows that the neofunctionalist thesis does
not bear fruit. Economic outcomes do not explain public support in all countries; notably
the regression is not signicant for Austria and Luxembourg. Moreover, the logic of ne-
ofunctionalism does not work the same across all countries. In my regression analysis,
neofunctionalist theory would predict that higher unemployment, higher ination, lower
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GDP growth, and lower trade would all lead to a decline in support. Importantly, while
this logic works in most cases, it is not true of all the countries. For example, for Italy,
this logic is reversed as higher ination and higher unemployment suggest higher public
support for the EU. For Denmark, lower GDP growth is associated with higher support
for the EU. In the Netherlands, it is unemployment which doesn’t t the mold. Hence the
analyses show little to no support for my rst two hypotheses.
33
Table 3.3: Individual Country Regressions I
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
(Intercept) 1.0944 -0.4096 -0.6142 -0.1775 0.6357 0.5421 -0.5476* 0.3968*
( 0.884) ( 0.556) ( 0.334) ( 0.224) ( 0.549) ( 0.393) ( 0.189) ( 0.172)
GDP -0.8736 -0.2839 -1.6252* -1.2577* 2.6129 0.2503 3.7627* 2.2267*
( 1.591) ( 1.5) ( 0.811) ( 0.594) ( 2.346) ( 1.223) ( 1.637) ( 0.765)
Ination -0.0468 0.0091* -0.0296* -0.0264* 0.0131 0.0054 -0.0026 -0.0283*
( 0.024) ( 0.004) ( 0.003) ( 0.01) ( 0.009) ( 0.01) ( 0.004) ( 0.003)
Unemployment -0.0674 -0.0051 -0.0115 -0.0086 0.0013 -0.0291* 0.0085 -0.0219*
( 0.045) ( 0.009) ( 0.006) ( 0.005) ( 0.013) ( 0.008) ( 0.012) ( 0.004)
Export Ratio -0.7758 1.2997 1.6304* 0.874 -0.4197 0.2281 1.4889* 0.7806*
( 1.018) ( 0.674) ( 0.449) ( 0.442) ( 0.727) ( 0.63) ( 0.255) ( 0.286)
N 32 73 73 35 73 73 60 69
RMSE 0.0962 0.1024 0.0906 0.0659 0.1298 0.1066 0.1248 0.1041
AdjustedR2 0.0348 0.125 0.7349 0.1749 0.1705 0.2789 0.4902 0.7129
* p ≤ 0.05
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Table 3.4: Individual Country Regressions II
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
(Intercept) -0.9959* 0.8865* -1.257 0.7115 1.2423* -2.7955 -0.9675*
( 0.265) ( 0.131) ( 0.701) ( 0.534) ( 0.298) ( 1.654) ( 0.294)
GDP 1.2248 0.1502 -1.5577 0.9912 0.2543 -3.9645 1.8352
( 1.077) ( 0.503) ( 1.233) ( 1.212) ( 1.417) ( 2.152) ( 1.742)
Ination 0.0244* -0.0043 0.0044 0.0156* 0.0212* 3e-04 0.0015
( 0.002) ( 0.003) ( 0.011) ( 0.004) ( 0.007) ( 0.027) ( 0.004)
Unemployment 0.0536* -0.0143* 0.0419* -0.0476* -0.017* -0.0294 0.002
( 0.007) ( 0.007) ( 0.009) ( 0.009) ( 0.004) ( 0.022) ( 0.007)
Export Ratio 1.6021* -0.1237 2.2453* 0.0522 -0.7194 5.3871 1.9637*
( 0.438) ( 0.168) ( 0.862) ( 0.615) ( 0.39) ( 2.776) ( 0.512)
N 73 73 55 50 50 32 73
RMSE 0.0961 0.0656 0.0817 0.0873 0.0908 0.1575 0.1467
AdjustedR2 0.6888 0.0426 0.2697 0.7316 0.4122 0.1801 0.2427
* p ≤ 0.05
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Moving on to my third hypothesis, postfunctionalism would predict that countries
with strong radical right parties experience greater politicization of European integration
and hence, economic variables should explain public support to a lesser extent. Within
the EU15 countries that I analyze, the ones with the strongest radical right parties are
as follows: Austria (Austrian Freedom Party), Denmark (Progress Party, People’s Party),
Belgium (Vlaams Blok), Netherlands (Freedom Party), Italy (Lega Nord, MSI/AN), Greece
(Golden Dawn).7 So, do we see economic variables explaining less variance in public
support in these countries? Unfortunately, the results are quite mixed. While in the case
of Austria and Sweden it is clear that economic variables do not explain public support but
this is not the case for other countries. However, in Italy, Denmark, and Greece, economic
variables explain a large amount of the variation in public support. Hence, the evidence
in favor of my third hypothesis is, at best, mixed. So where does that leave us?
3.6 Towards alternative indicators
The Maastricht Treaty not only signaled the start of positive integration in the social
sphere, it also setup a monetary union with the eventual creation of the ECB and the
adoption of the Euro. In order to achieve this goal, monetary convergence criteria were
agreed upon in 1992 which every country had to abide by. These criteria sought to lower
the interest rate and ination dierentials across the member states along with reigning
in government budget decits. In the case of ination, these criteria were quite successful
as they managed to bring down the quite vast dierentials in ination across the member
states (Lane, 2006). Even though the ination dierentials rose a little after the adoption
of the Euro, in general, they remained much smaller than prior to 1992. Indeed, ination
in the Eurozone as a whole was lowered considerably. However, public perception of
ination increased after the adoption of the Euro (Eichengreen, 2010). Hence there exists
a clear disconnect between the actual ination numbers and the its perception by the
7The list of parties is partly from Norris (2005).
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public. The point of this discussion is two-fold. First, I am making the argument that
the move towards creating a monetary union has altered the relationship which existed
between economic variables and public support prior to the Maastricht Treaty. Hence, it
should come as no surprise that ination (and, possibly, the other variables) do not explain
public support in the post-Maastricht era. My second claim that the adoption of the Euro
has skewed the publics perception of the economic indicators themselves. If all of this is
true, not all the economic variables which predicted public support prior to 1992 would
work the same way.
The last four decades have also seen declining, or at best stagnant, real incomes in most
developed countries. According to recent work by Inglehart and Norris (2017, p. 448), this,
combined with rising income and wealth inequality, has led to rising levels of existential
insecurity and hence the rising popularity of radical right parties in Europe and the US.
The EU, with its neoliberal economic agenda and its commitment to the free movement
of capital, goods and people, makes an easy target for the radical right in Europe. The
EU can be (and is) readily blamed by these parties for depressing wages that labor can
command. Hence, any future research into whether economics drives support for the EU
must necessarily take into account factors such as the level of inequality (Gini coecient)
and the perceived economic threat posed by immigrants. European integration, as Judt
(1996, p. 23) mentions, was “made necessary by circumstance and rendered possible by
prosperity.” It now has to survive in an era of austerity.
The next chapter only indirectly looks at the role of economics in driving support for
the EU or, more specically, Europe. I look at how revised modernization theory, with its




Cognitive Mobilization and Postmaterialism
This chapter looks at European integration in the context of modernization theory and
changing values in the Western Europe. Modernization theory, in general, looks at the
changes in society wrought by a move from an agricultural to industrial society (and be-
yond) and its impact on the political order (Deutsch, 1961; Lerner and Pevsner, 1958; Lipset,
1960; Inglehart, 1997). The process of modernization has been dened by Karl Deutsch as
one where “advanced, non-traditional practices in culture, technology and economic life
are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale” (Deutsch, 1961, p. 493). As such, the
process is closely linked with industrial development and the changes that come along
with it. These changes include “urbanization, mass education, occupational specializa-
tion, bureaucratization, and communications development” and lead to cultural, social,
and political transformations (Inglehart, 1997, p. 8). For Deutsch, all these changes lead to
social mobilization, which is a part of modernization. Deutsch dened social mobilization
as the process by which “old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded
or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior”
(Deutsch, 1961, p. 494). The social and political implications of this process of social mobi-
lization include: a) an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population, b) the
transformation of social and political practices and institutions, c) the provision of gov-
ernment services in education, health care, law & order, d) a shift in political leadership,
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and e) a focus on and consolidation of the nation state (Deutsch, 1961).
In the decades following the 1950’s and 60’s, modernization theory came to be in-
creasingly criticized for being linear, deterministic, and ethnocentric. The early versions
of modernization theory assumed that social and cultural change, along with economic
development, moves in one direction until the end of history, namely the achievement of
a liberal democratic world order. This was problematic because it became increasingly
clear that all newly industrialized societies with increasing educational levels and per
capita GDP did not tend towards higher levels of democracy. Many modernization theo-
rists also emphasized that a society’s economic system determines its politics and culture
or vice versa. However, neither economics, nor culture complete accounts for political
outcomes and political scientists looked at including institutions as mediating the eects
of economics and culture. Finally, modernization theorists drew upon the experiences of
Western societies and assumed that all societies would follow this path, thus equating
modernization with Westernization. These shortcomings were addressed by Ronald In-
glehart and his collaborators with a revised version of modernization theory (Inglehart,
1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). This revised version is based on the theory of inter-
generational value change which, in turn, is based on two key hypotheses. The rst is
the scarcity hypothesis which states that socioeconomic conditions eect an individual’s
priorities in that we put the greatest value on that which is in short supply.1 The sec-
ond, namely the socialization hypothesis, says that an individual’s value priorities, to a
large extent, reect the socioeconomic conditions prevalent during their preadult years
(Inglehart, 1997, p. 33). According to this theory, value change in society depends on a
couple of factors: socioeconomic development and the transition from one generation to
another. The theory also emphasizes that this value change is not linear. As an indus-
trial society transitions to a postindustrial, services-oriented society, value orientations
of individuals in these societies also change in a non-linear fashion. According to the re-
1This is based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943).
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vised modernization theory, the origins of these postmodern values lies in the fact that
economic development had allowed individuals (at least in industrial societies) the luxury
of existential security; people were growing up with the awareness that their survival
could be taken for granted (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 30-3). This new value orientation has
been called postmaterialist, and it signies a shift away from materialist goals like eco-
nomic and physical security with an emphasis on the nation-state towards goals such as
self-expression and a declining emphasis on authority (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 35–9).
Hence we see that the revised version of modernization theory is a story of value
change in society caused by changing socioeconomic conditions. The changes in the val-
ues held by individuals lead to profound changes in social and political institutions. For
example, the move towards postmaterialist and self-expression values has been associated
with democratization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and a reorientations of views towards
gender and sexuality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). In this chapter I will look at if and
how this change in values has aected the process of identication with a supra-national
body, namely the European Union. The next section looks at our theoretical understand-
ings of how value change might impact the European integration process. Based on these
theories, I propose some hypotheses and proceed to test them using data from the Euro-
barometer and World Values Survey.
4.1 In the context of European Integration
In the period after World War II, the six western European countries which initially
came to form European Coal and Steel Community experienced high levels of economic
growth and prosperity. During this period, the population of these countries enjoyed un-
precedented levels of existential security while at the same time the “ever-closer union” of
the six Western European countries proceeded apace. It was in this context that modern-
ization theory, based on the theory of intergenerational value change, was applied to the
societies of the European Community. The theorizing took two distinct but complemen-
40
tary paths. The rst was a continuation of Deutsch’s theory of ‘social mobilization’ and
looked at citizen’s shifting loyalties to a supra-national body. This was called cognitive
mobilization. The second path looked at the change in the value orientation of individual’s
in these societies (from material to postmaterial values) and its impact on public support
for the European integration project. Both these strands were explored by Ronald Ingle-
hart in the 1970’s and I take a closer look at each in the sections below (Inglehart, 1970,
1971).
4.1.1 Cognitive Mobilization
As Deutsch (1961) surmised, the process of social mobilization expanded the politically
relevant strata of society. As more and more people were brought into the political pro-
cess, power was consolidated in the nation-state. However, in the early stages of European
integration, some decision making power went from the nation-state to a supra-national
entity. This shift in power also went along with higher levels of education and greater
media use. Hence, Inglehart dened the process of cognitive mobilization as a continua-
tion of social mobilization which leads to the “increasingly wide distribution of political
skills necessary to cope with an extensive political community” (Inglehart, 1970, p. 47).
The increasing cognitive capabilities of the Western European publics does not automat-
ically lead to growing support for integration project. These skills are a necessary but
not sucient condition for identication with the European Union. The relationship be-
tween the two is mediated by messages from the mass media. Hence it was hypothesized
that predominantly positive media messages about European integrations would lead to
a generally favorable opinion towards integration in those individuals with higher levels
of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970, p. 48). As we have seen in the previous chapter,
the subject European integration was not very politicized during much of its history. It
was an elite project without much mass involvement. Hence, for a long while in the study
of European integration, it was safe to assume that the mass media portrayed integration
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in a positive light but with the recent nancial and refugee crises this assumption is no
longer valid (Statham and Trenz, 2015). In fact, a recent study of the media discourse about
the EU in the United Kingdom shows a strong anti-European bias (Shaw, 2016). However,
without adequate time-series data on the nature of media coverage in the EU15 countries,
it is not possible to test the exact role of media coverage in shaping opinion about the
integration project. A further impediment to gauging the use of media is the changing
nature of mass media itself, with the advent of the internet and the numerous ways in
which people get their news.
While the eect of the media on individuals is hard to measure, there have been a
number of proposed measures of cognitive mobilization itself. The rst measure is formal
education, with higher levels of education leading to higher levels of cognitive mobiliza-
tion (Inglehart, 1970, p. 47). This indicator comes from the denition of the process itself
and has been used by a number of researchers over the years (Duchesne and Frognier,
1995; Wessels, 1995; Luhmann, 2017). Another indicator of cognitive mobilization is the
knowledge of EU institutions where those with greater awareness of EU institutions hav-
ing said to have more cognitive skills. This indicator was used by Inglehart (1970, p. 54)
and the results of that analysis show it to be a much more powerful predictor of pro-
European attitudes than education. However, the changed wording of questions related
to the knowledge of EU institutions in the Eurobarometer make it unsuitable for time-
series analysis (Nissen, 2014, p. 721). Another measure of cognitive mobilization used by
researchers focuses on how frequently individuals discuss politics and how often they
try and persuade others of their own political opinions. Duchesne and Frognier (1995,
p. 214) combines both these variables into an ‘opinion leadership index’ and nds that
higher levels of this index indicate greater support for integration. Luhmann (2017) sim-
ilarly operationalized cognitive mobilization, keeping separate variables for frequency of
political discussion and persuading others. Following these researchers, I operationalize
cognitive mobilization using the level of education, frequency of political discussion, and
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persuading others of one’s own political views. This leads to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of education are associated with greater identi-
cation with Europe. This relationship holds across the EU15 countries and over
time.
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for the level of education, individuals who discuss
politics and persuade others of their political views more frequently have greater
identication with Europe. This relationship holds across the EU15 countries and
over time.
4.1.2 The shift towards Postmaterialist Values
As mentioned above, the shift towards postmaterialist values is based on the theory of
intergenerational value change. But, what exactly comprises postmaterialist values and
what does this shift signify for European integration? In survey data, the postmaterialist
value orientation is most commonly measured by asking respondents of their value pri-
orities. The respondents are asked to list their top two value priorities from a choice of
a) maintaining order in the nation, b) ghting rising prices, c) giving people more say in
political decisions, and d) protecting freedom of speech (Inglehart, 1971, p. 5). The rst
two choices signify a materialist value orientation (the focus is on material security) while
the last two signify a postmaterialist orientation. Respondents who choose one from the
rst two and one from the last two are classied as having a ‘mixed’ orientation. It has
been posited that postmaterialists are expected to have a more cosmopolitan outlook than
materialists. This is because they are less focused on immediate needs and because the
nation-state has traditionally derived most of its legitimacy from providing security (In-
glehart, 1977, p. 151).2 If a process of intergenerational value change is indeed taking place,
we would expect the younger, postmaterialist cohorts to gradually increase support for
2This reasoning is open to the objection that European integration itself started due to the very material
concerns of preventing war in Europe and securing trade between the participating countries. However,
as European integration has proceeded, the EU has aligned itself with ideas such as human rights, equality
and democracy, such that many observers explicitly link the EU with cosmopolitanism (Delanty, 2005).
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the EU. However, it is not clear that this is taking place. An analysis of combined Euro-
barometer and World Values Survey data by Inglehart has shown that the birth cohorts
born in 1976–85 and 1966–75 are not more postmaterialist that the previous cohort born
in 1956–65. Prior to this, the theory held and previous birth cohorts were signicantly
less postmaterialist (Inglehart, 2008, p. 136). This has been attributed to slower levels of
economic growth and rising income inequality.
Over the last four decades, this theory of intergenerational values change has been
extensively debated. Shively (1991) contends that it is not possible to distinguish between
generational, life-cycle (value change over an individual’s life), and period eects (changes
due to short term socioeconomic conditions). A critique by Clarke and Dutt (1991) has ar-
gued that measure materialist / postmaterialist values does not take unemployment into
account. The reasoning is that an individual concerned about unemployment would be
likely to choose that its important to have more say in political decisions. Duch and Taylor
(1993), Davis (1996) and Warwick (1998) argue that rather than socialization, it is education
that most aects levels of postmaterialism. Similarly, Janssen (1991) argues that it is the
indicators of cognitive mobilization, rather than levels of postmaterialism, which explain
support for European integration. Sacchi (1998) raises concerns about the dimensional-
ity of the postmaterialism value construct, arguing that the items tap into multiple value
dimensions. Davis and Davenport (1999) criticize the construction of the index, arguing
that if we know the respondent’s rst goal, we cannot predict the second and hence the
responses are random. These critiques, along with others, have been addressed by Ingle-
hart and his collaborators over the years. These exchanges have been well summarized
by Abramson (2011) and are too numerous to detail here.
Based on this discussion of postmaterialist values, I expect those classied as post-
materialists identify with a supranational body such as the EU more than materialists or
those with a ‘mixed’ value orientation. This is because they would likely have a more
cosmopolitan orientation. I also expect that this relationship holds over time.
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Hypothesis 3: Postmaterialists identify with a supranational body with more
probability than materialists so. This relationship holds over time.
4.2 Measures and Method
To test the hypotheses regarding cognitive mobilization, I use data from the Euro-
barometer surveys from 1992 to 2016. The data was collected from the Mannheim Trend
le (Schmitt and Scholz, 2005) and individual Eurobarometer les from EB 58 to EB 86
and analyzed for the countries which comprise the EU-15.3 The choice of the time period
under consideration (1992–2006) is dictated by the availability of the dependent variable
used in the analysis. This is the ‘Moreno’ question which asks respondents if they, in the
near future, see themselves as a) <nationality> only, b) <nationality> and European, c) Eu-
ropean and <nationality>, or d) European only. The question was originally developed by
Luis Moreno in the context of national and sub-national attachments in Scotland and Cat-
alonia (Moreno, 2006). It has been described as a measure of “aective identication of
self with the political community” by Segatti and Westle (2016, p. 23). Importantly, this is
a measure of identication with Europe as opposed to a measure of specic support for
the EU. The question itself allows for dual identication with country and Europe and is
also a measure of the intensity of that identication (Segatti and Westle, 2016, p. 26). It
has been criticized for forcing the respondent to choose one identity over another as it
competitively activates both (Caporaso and Kim, 2009, p. 23). However, the advantages
of using this measure, namely allowing dual-identication and its availability as a long
time-series for all fteen countries, far outweigh the disadvantages. The question has
been asked in at least one Eurobarometer survey every year from 1992 to 2016, except in
1996, 2006, 2008 and 2009. Hence, we have data for twenty years within this time period.
The independent variables used in this analysis are the indicators for cognitive mo-
3These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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bilization. The education variable in the Eurobarometer surveys asks the respondent’s
age when they completed their full-time education. I have recoded this variable into the
following categories: a) Incomplete Secondary, b) Completed Secondary, c) Incomplete
College / Vocational, and d) Completed College. For the measure of frequency of political
discussion, the Eurobarometer survey asks respondents to choose between ‘frequently’,
‘occasionally’ or ‘never’. The measure of persuasion asks respondents how often they
persuade others if they have a strong opinion. Respondents choose between ‘often’, ‘from
time to time’, ‘rarely’, or ‘never’. Both of these questions have a long history in the Euro-
barometer surveys and have been asked in most years between 1975 and 2016. However,
they were not always asked in the same survey as our dependent variable. Hence, the
inclusion of these two variables shortens the time series to between 1992 and 2012, minus
1994, 1996 and 2006–09, for a total of sixteen years.
In order to test the postmaterialism hypothesis, I use combined data from the World
Values Survey and European Values Survey. The Eurobarometer surveys are unsuitable
for use here because the value priorities questions have only been asked as a continu-
ous time series until 1994. While they have been asked in four years since (1997, 1999,
2005 and 2008), there is not enough recent time series data and it doesn’t include all the
EU-15 countries I analyze. The WVS/EVS data presents the most complete time series
and was conducted in six waves spanning the time period 1981–2014. Figure 4.1 shows
a preliminary cohort analysis of the weighted WVS/EVS data. We see the percentage of
postmaterialists minus the percentage of materialists separated by their birth cohort. The
graph largely corroborates the results of the analysis in Inglehart (2008) by showing that
levels of postmaterialism have largely stagnated in cohorts who were socialized in the
1970’s and beyond.
For the dependent variable in this analysis, the combined WVS/EVS has a question in
which respondents were asked which geographical group the belonged to rst. Respon-
dents had to choose between locality, region, country, Europe, and the world. This is the
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Figure 4.1: Levels of postmaterialism by birth cohort
same variable used in the analysis of regional belonging in Inglehart (1977). The variable
has been asked in all waves of the WVS/EVS, except the last wave, hence my analysis
includes the rst ve waves of the combined WVS/EVS, covering the years between 1980
and 2010.
4.3 Analysis
The hypotheses are tested using mixed eects logistic regression. The use of logistic
regression allows us to keep the dependent variable as having its original levels. Mixed
eects regression is used as the individual responses are clustered by country and by year.
Using a cross-classied model, we can allow the intercept to vary by country and year in
the model, hence making it suitable for the time-series cross-sectional data we have here
(Gelman and Hill, 2006). The estimated model is given in equation 4.1. In this equation,
i indexes all observations and j indexes the response categories. The country and year
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eects are taken to be random and assumed to be normally distributed. The model was
t using the R statistical computing environment and using the lme4 package for mixed
model analysis (Bates et al., 2015). The results of the analysis are given in table 4.1. The
rst model is a regression of the identity variables against level of education. The second
model adds the variables for frequency of political discussion and persuading others.
logit(P (Yi ≤ j)) = θj − β1(educationi)− β2(discussi)− β3(persuadei)
− u(countryi)− v(yeari) (4.1)
i = 1, . . . , n
j = 1, 2, 3
u(countryi) ∼ N(0, σ2u)
v(yeari) ∼ N(0, σ2v)
The results in table 4.1 largely support hypotheses one and two as all the coecients
are positive and signicant. We see that those with higher levels of education are more
likely to identify as European. The eect stays positive and signicant even with the in-
troduction of the other measure of cognitive mobilization. From the second model, we see
that those who discuss politics frequently are more likely identify as European than those
who never discuss politics. Similarly, those who persuade others of their political views
often tend identify as European more than those who never persuade others. However,
the eect size of this variable peaks at those who persuade others from time to time. In
other words, the probability of identifying as European is highest for those who persuade
others from time to time, all other variable being equal. The eect size, along with 95%
condence intervals is shown gure 4.2. The eect size for a particular variable is calcu-
lated by keeping the other two variables at their mean. On all the graphs, the y-axis is the
eect size on the dependent variable. As we can see, in the case of education, the eect
size increases almost linearly as the level of education rises. It is also the case that edu-
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Table 4.1: Mixed eects logistic regression with Eurobarometer data.




Completed Secondary School 0.475∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.011)
Some College / Vocational 0.849∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012)


















Std Dev of Random Eects
Country 0.44704 0.48296
Year 0.13133 0.10971
N / Country / Year 466,143 / 15 / 21 269,534 / 15 / 14
Log Likelihood −297,267.500 −170,474.600
AIC 594,547.100 340,971.300
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
cation has a larger eect than the other two variables in the model. This analysis largely
conrms that the cognitive mobilization hypothesis is still valid.
While the mixed model analysis tells us of the eect of cognitive mobilization on iden-
tication with Europe, it doesn’t clearly tell us if and how this has changed over time. In
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Figure 4.2: Eect size for Model 2
order to get a good sense of change over time I ran the regression model specied above
for each year. There were twenty-one regressions for the rst model an fourteen for the
second. The results are given in gures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. In gure 4.3 we see the results
of a yearly regression on the identity variable on educational level from 1992 to 2016.
The probability of choosing a national or European identity given the level of education
hasn’t changed much over this time period. We can see that almost 60% of respondents
who haven’t completed school choose an exclusively national identication, while only
25% of respondents who have completed college choose that. The probability of exclusive
identication with Europe is quite low at less than ten percent for the entire time series
and has been decreasing. However, given its low levels throughout, the change is not very
much. For all the identications which involve Europe (mixed national or European and
exclusively European), we see that educational levels follow a predictable pattern where a
respondent who has completed college has the highest probability while a respondent who
hasn’t complete secondary school has the lowest probability. Hence, we can conclusively
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say that the the probability of choosing a mixed or exclusively European identication
increases the level of education.
Figure 4.3: Time series probability of identication by educational level
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 shows the results of a yearly regression of model 2. The indepen-
dent variables are the level of education, frequency of political discussion and persuading
others and the regression was conducted for fourteen years between 1992 and 2012. From
gure 4.4 we see that those who discuss politics often tend to have a higher probability
of identifying as exclusively European and mixed European and national (and vice versa).
Again, the probability of exclusively identifying with Europe is very low and doesn’t in-
crease over time and in fact, there is a slight decrease. The probability trends do support
the cognitive mobilization hypothesis, with those who are more engaged with politics
tending to have a more identication with Europe.
Finally, in gure 4.5 we see that support for the cognitive mobilization hypothesis is
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Figure 4.4: Time series probability of identication frequency of political discussion
less clear. Those who more frequently persuade others of politics do not always have a
greater identication with Europe. However, there is a clear dierence between those who
never persuade others and those who persuade others often, from time to time, or rarely.
Hence, it might make more sense to analyze this variable as binary, given the nature of
the predicted probability. We see that those who never persuade others are more likely to
identify as exclusively national. Those who persuade others (frequently or not) are more
likely to identify as mixed national / European than those who never persuade others.
Both these relationships hold for the time period under consideration. For the other two
identity categories (mixed European / national and exclusively European) we see that the
probability of choosing either is very low and that there is not much dierence in the
levels of persuading others.
Turning now to the analysis on value orientation, I use combined WVS/EVS data to
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Figure 4.5: Time series probability of identication by frequency of persuading others
test if higher levels of postmaterialism are associated with a more cosmopolitan identi-
cation. The dependent variable in this analysis asks respondents which geographical
entity they identify with rst. The choices are locality, region, country, Europe, and the
world. The results of the regression analysis are shown in table 4.2. We see that the value
orientation coecients positive and signicant, thus indicating identication with larger,
more extensive, geographical entities is associated with postmaterialist values.
According to the time series in gure 4.6, we see that overall, identication with Eu-
rope or the world is quite low, even among postmaterialists. However, of those who iden-
tify as such, they are more likely to be postmaterialists. Interestingly, we also see that
the probability of identication with country is 35 to 40% for postmaterialists and 25 to
30% for materialists. The reverse is true for identication with locality. And so, this leads
to the result that while postmaterialists, in general, identify with a more extensive politi-
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Table 4.2: Mixed eects logistic regression to test the postmaterialism hypothesis.









Std Dev of Random Eects
Country 0.2976
Wave 0.1212
N / Country / Wave 75,428 / 15 / 4
Log Likelihood −50,580.850
Akaike Inf. Crit. 101,171.700
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
cal community, this political community is not necessarily supra-national. While around
20% of postmaterialists identify with either Europe or the world, 40% of postmaterialists
identify with their country. Hence we can say that while it not true that the majority of
postmaterialists primarily identify with a supra-national entity, those who do are likely
to be postmaterialists.
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Figure 4.6: Time series probability of identication by value orientation
4.4 Discussion
The results of the analysis in the previous section clearly show that identication with
Europe increases with levels of cognitive mobilization, thus showing support for previous
studies by Inglehart (1970), Duchesne and Frognier (1995) and Luhmann (2017). It is inter-
esting to look at this in the context of rising educational levels. When the Eurobarometer
surveys started, six to seven percent of all respondents had completed college. This rose
to thirteen percent by 1992 and almost thirty percent by 2016. Given this trend in rising
educational levels we can expect overall identication with Europe to go up. However,
what we are seeing is that there is less exclusive identication with the nation. As edu-
cational levels rise and Europe come to play a larger role in peoples’ consciousness, we
see rising levels of simultaneous identication with Europe and the nation. And we also
see that those who discuss politics frequently tend to identify less exclusively with the
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nation.
When we look at exclusive identication with Europe, the picture is a little troubling.
Absolute levels of respondents who identify exclusively with Europe has stayed much the
same in the last twenty-ve years. And this is true even with rising levels of education. Of
course, one can make the argument that I am asking Europe to do in fty years what the
nation-state accomplished in a few hundred. This is undoubtedly true, as is the fact that
exclusive identication with the nation-state is decreasing. However, Europe has not yet
captured the public imagination in the way that the nation state has; it has not yet led to
an aective European identity. My sixth chapter looks at whether it could do so, especially
by the construction of an ‘other’. Before that I turn to a discussion of how nationalism
can play an instrumental role in generating support. The next chapter discusses how, and




The founders of the project of European integration have long predicted that national
identity would diminish over time. For the founders of the ECSC one of the primary goals
was to reorient identication away from the nation, thus leading to a more peaceful Eu-
rope. For Jean Monnet, “Europeans had to overcome the mistrust born of centuries of
feud and war” in order to establish peace and so “one had to go beyond the nation and
the conception of national interest as an end in itself” (Monnet, 1963, p. 205). Integration
theorists have long maintained that as functional integration proceeds apace, the citi-
zens of the European countries would shift their loyalties to European institutions (Haas,
1958). They also hypothesized that as loyalties shifted towards Europe, this would weaken
national and sub-national identities. Some observers went on to associate a nascent Eu-
ropean identity as being postnational and cosmopolitan, one which would take us away
from the trappings of the nation-state (Delanty, 2005; Delanty and Rumford, 2005).
However, as is clear from the various measures of European identity studied in the
previous chapters, identication with Europe (and especially with the EU) is much lower
than identication with the nation. And more recently, the deepening and widening of EU
integration, Brexit notwithstanding, has been accompanied by a resurgence of right-wing
nationalist parties. The recent nancial and immigrant crises have had the unintended
consequence of highlighting the democratic decit of the EU. In many European countries,
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and especially Greece and Portugal, “electoral democracy, a crucial institutional embod-
iment of national consciousness, is [thought to be] under threat from the EU” (Hosking,
2016, p. 219). This has lead to increasing support for radical right parties which have a
strong anti-immigrant and anti-EU agenda (Eger and Valdez, 2015). In this chapter, it is
not these radical right parties which are under investigation. Rather I consider how, and
if, integration aects regionalist parties. It has long been hypothesized that regionalist
parties would be pro-EU because the EU makes smaller, more homogeneous state more
viable. Hence, the EU could well provide a viable means for a region to secede. In this
chapter, I consider the stance of regionalist parties towards the EU and the attitudes of
people living in these regions towards the EU.
Here, regional integration refers to the process of “political and economic integration
by European states, formalized in the European Union” (Jolly, 2015, p. 2). Regional inte-
gration is most advanced in the EU, but has parallels in integration projects such as the
African Union, ASEAN in Asia and Mercosur in South America. Regionalism, on the other
hand, refers to minority nationalism in established states (Jolly, 2015, p. 2). Regionalist
parties typically aim for greater autonomy and ethnic or linguistic rights within the state,
while sometimes seeking independence as their end goal. For regionalist parties, compe-
tition is framed around the center-periphery cleavage, one of the four cleavages which,
for Lipset and Rokkan (1967, p. 123), structure party competition in Western Europe. The
cleavage was formed due to nation building in some states given that regional populations
were either linguistically, ethnically or religiously dierent from the central elites (Jolly,
2015, p. 15). In this chapter I consider regionalist movements in Spain, Belgium and the
United Kingdom. I chose these three Western European countries due to the prominence
of their historical and/or active secessionist movements (Coppieters, 2010, p. 237).
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5.1 The Viability of States
In the last few decades, a number of economists have turned their attention to optimal
state size. According to this literature, the optimal size of a state depends on a trade-
o between eciency and heterogeneity (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina, Spolaore
and Wacziarg, 2000). Larger states have many economic advantages over smaller ones,
namely a) the cost of nonrival public goods decreases as the costs are spread over a larger
population, b) an increase in the size of the market where the costs of international trade
are absent and c) the cost of uninsurable shocks is greater for smaller states (Alesina and
Spolaore, 1997, p. 1029). These advantages are tempered by the fact that larger countries
usually have a more diverse population and the state needs to provide public goods to
satisfy diverse preferences (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, p. 1029). Using a formal model,
Alesina and Spolaore make a two-fold argument: on the one hand democracy leads to
secession and an ineciently large number of states while on the other hand economic
integration increases the equilibrium number of countries (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, p.
1028). For European integration, this implies that deepening economic integration should
make smaller states more viable (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998;
Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2000; Wittman, 2000).
This argument is carried forward by Jolly (2015) who contends that European integra-
tion diminishes the advantages of larger states and so makes smaller homogeneous states
more appealing to regional elites and citizens. His argument is that the EU provides many
public goods, in the form of monetary, regulatory, environmental and trade policy. The
EU also provides a disaster relief fund to help with uninsurable shocks. Financial crises
and other asymmetrical socks can be somewhat mitigated by the EU with the provision of
structural funds. The single market removes trade barriers and gives all member countries
equal access to a large single market. The European Defense Agency, along with NATO,
removes the fears of a foreign invasion, thus allowing countries to reduce defense expen-
diture. Finally, independence from larger EU nation-states would allow smaller states to
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have greater cultural autonomy and thus protect the regions language and culture. It is
for all these reasons that Jolly (2015, pp. 41–47) hypothesizes that both regional elites as
well as citizens would favor the EU and would like deeper integration.
However, this argument seems a little too simplistic to me. While viability theory
does correctly predict that the equilibrium number of states would be larger given deeper
regional integration, there are certain costs of integration to a smaller state which are
overlooked here. For example, the elites and citizens of Catalonia would appreciate the
fact that the EU provides a bargaining chip in their demands for greater autonomy from
Spain, the EU also allows free movement of people which leads to greater migration within
Europe. Hence, any perceived gains from regional integration have to be tempered with
the fact that the EU can lead to increased heterogeneity within the region with greater
amounts of migration from Eastern Europe as well as the settlement of refugees from
outside Europe. This threatens the very purpose of regional parties, namely the protection
of their language and culture. Another point which bears discussion is that the EU could
very well be seen as the replacement of the nation-state by regionalist parties. Given
that power has been transferred from the nation-state to the EU, independence from the
nation-state might not amount to much in the long run. Finally, if it is control of national
governments which is needed in order to inuence policy-making at the EU, regionalist
parties would nd it more protable to ght for control at the national level rather than
looking to break away. It is for these reasons I argue that attitudes of regionalist parties
as well as citizens in those regions would not necessarily be positive towards the EU. This
chapter, like this dissertation, is focused on public attitudes towards the EU but in the next
section I briey speak about regionalist party positions.
5.2 Regionalist Party Attitudes towards Europe
Much of the academic discussion on regionalist parties has focused on the concept of
‘Europe of the Regions’. This was the slogan adopted by regionalist parties with the hope
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that the EU would give legal and institutional recognition to minority nations within the
existing European nation-sates (Elias, 2008b, p. 484). This went along with academic work
which showed the growing empowerment of the sub-state level where decision-making
power and implementation of policies gradually shifted away from the nation-state and
was diused to multiple levels (Marks, 1993; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). As political power
moved away from the nation-state and went above (to the EU) and below (to sub-state
actors), it was thought that this would lead to the empowerment of regionalist parties
and progress would be made towards a ‘Europe of the Regions’. However, it soon became
clear that decision-making power was moving to the supranational level and sub-state
actors were beneting little from this redistribution of power (Elias, 2008b, p. 486). While
in the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty a Committee of the Regions was
setup in 1994, it led to a certain demobilization and the regional dimension was largely
ignored in Amsterdam and Nice (Loughlin, 2005, p. 162). And while the principle of
subsidiarity—which in theory would dene competencies for the regions—was introduced
in the Maastricht Treaty, there is little evidence that it took decision making power away
from EU institutions (Weatherill, 2005, pp. 136–7).
Even though the EU institutional framework has not included regions in a meaningful
way, the EU itself has grown in importance for regional parties. This is because decentral-
ization has proceeded apace in many European countries and this has given regional gov-
ernments the responsibility of implementing and enforcing EU legislation (Elias, 2008b,
p. 487). Moreover, European integration has provided a platform for regionalist parties in
many dierent member states to come together and collectively bargain for greater com-
petencies. This may be through the Committee of the Regions or a coalition in the Euro-
pean Parliament such as the European Free Alliance (De Winter and Cachafeiro, 2002, p.
485). In addition to this, many regional actors have increased their presence in Brussels
with the hope of inuencing policy (Elias, 2008b, p. 487). And nally, Europe provides an
important symbolic space where regional parties can push for self-determination (Hep-
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burn, 2008, p. 539).
Notwithstanding the growing importance of the EU for regional actors, there is a cer-
tain frustration creeping in with the lack of transfer of competencies to regions. Hepburn
(2008) conducts an analysis of the positions of regionalist parties in Scotland, Bavaria and
Sardinia towards Europe from the 1970’s to the 2000’s and nds that party positions ex-
hibit a cyclical nature, shifting from pro-integration stances to stances opposed to the EU
and then back again. There have also been a variety of responses to European integration,
from demands of greater recognition to protests against any threats to their competencies
(Hepburn, 2008, p. 549). While there was growing convergence in the 1990’s as regionalist
parties came together around the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’, the lack of any mean-
ingful progress in the transfer of competencies to regional actors has left many parties
disillusioned (Hepburn, 2008; Elias, 2008a).
Figure 5.1: EU Position by Party Family
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This change in regionalist party position towards the EU is seen in 5.1. Here we see
the change in party position by party family in Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
The data comes from the Chappel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) which surveys experts on
party positions on (amongst other issues) European integration in a number of dierent
European countries (Polk et al., 2017; Bakker et al., 2015). The rst waves of the survey
was conducted in 1999 with subsequent waves in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. This dataset
was combined with a previous set of expert surveys conducted by Leonard Ray in 1984,
1988, 1992, and 1996 (Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Ray, 1999). The graph shows that
over time, regionalist parties have consistently positive views on the EU. Amongst the
regionalist parties there exist some ideologically extreme ones such as the Vlaams Blok
or Vlaams Belang in Belgium. These are right-wing parties which are anti-EU but since
they are also regionalist parties, they are classied as such. And as gure 5.1 averages the
EU position by party families, the trend for regionalist parties would have been higher
had these parties not been considered. Figure 5.1 also conrms the analysis on regionalist
party position in Jolly (2015, p. 96–8). We see that regionalist party attitudes towards
the EU decline in the mid-1990’s until the mid-2000s and then increase. This is in line
with the reasoning that regionalist parties became disenchanted with the lack of progress
towards a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in the mid-1990s. Figure 5.2 breaks down the data by
country. We see that except for the UK, the regionalist party position on the EU is quite
similar to the aggregate of other parties. In the UK, we see that regionalist parties view
the EU quite a bit more favorably than other parties do.
In this section we have seen the positions of regionalist parties towards the EU. While
it can be argued that regionalist parties are, in general, more positive towards the EU
than other party families, they are still not the most Europhilic except in the case of the
UK. This tells us that the concept of ‘Europe of the Regions’ has not played out as hoped
by regionalist parties and this has led to changing levels of support for the EU. Also, as
regionalist parties have come to realize that the way of inuencing policy at the EU level
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Figure 5.2: EU Position by Country
is through control of national politics, their focus has, in some cases, shifted towards the
The next section looks at public opinion towards the EU by region in order to understand
the stance of those who these parties are appealing to. Further, this is in order to check if
support for the EU comes from the regions which are looking for further autonomy from
the nation-state.
5.3 Public Attitude from the Periphery
The attitudes of regionalist political parties towards European integration is much
easier to measure than public attitude. This is because there has been no satisfactory an-
swer for how to operationalize regionalist attachment amongst the public. In this section
I look at two approaches to this problem, the solutions they have proposed, and discuss
their analyses. Then, I outline my own, admittedly more modest approach towards un-
derstanding dierences in public opinion between the center and periphery and present
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this analysis.
In his work on regionalist mobilization in Western Europe, Jolly (2015, p. 123) frames
the issue as such: why is it that as the European integration deepens, the UK seems more
likely to fragment? Framed in such a way, the question makes an assumption that there
is a causal relationship between further integration and the UK’s fragmentation. Neces-
sarily, this is an assumption which will need to be proven, and Jolly sets out to do just
that in his chapter on regionalism and public support for the EU. His analysis proceeds in
two complementary tracks. On the one hand he shows that regionalist parties, as a party
family, are more supportive of the EU than other and so these parties and elites cue their
supporters with favorable attitudes towards integration On the other hand, he demon-
strates that voters of these parties do indeed hold more favorable views towards the EU
(Jolly, 2015, p. 124). He operationalizes regionalist support by using the Eurobarometer
surveys and looking at the respondents vote intention. Voters who intend to vote for re-
gionalist parties are shown to be more supportive of the EU (Jolly, 2015, pp. 129–132). The
analysis is conducted for the years between 1984 and 2000, the years for which data is
available from the Mannheim trend le (Schmitt and Scholz, 2005). This support is in-
strumental in nature in that respondents support the EU in order to get greater regional
autonomy. The reasoning goes back the discussion of viability theory. One drawback of
this study is that in any given year, the number of regionalist party supporters is small. In
order to address this defect and strengthen the causal nature of this theory, Jolly examines
Scotland as a detailed case study and and shows the evolution of support for the EU over
time.
A second approach to analyzing public support from the regions has been presented
by Chacha (2013). The paper aims to ll a gap in the literature on public support for EU
integration, namely the “role that subnational attachment sentiments play in inuencing
public opinion towards European integration” (Chacha, 2013, pp. 206–7). Regional attach-
ment is operationalized in two distinct ways using the Eurobarometer surveys. Inclusive
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regional attachment is measured by an variable which asks respondents, on a four point
scale, to what extent they are attached to the regions they inhabit. Exclusive regional
attachment is operationalized as a binary variable that measures whether the respondent
has a higher level of regional or national attachment (Chacha, 2013, p. 214). These vari-
ables, along with a slew of sociodemographic controls, are run through a multi-level anal-
ysis with the dependent variable measuring EU support. The results show that inclusive
regional attachment is positively associated with EU support but there is no statistically
signicant relationship between exclusive regional attachment and EU support (Chacha,
2013, p. 216). Hence, those individuals who exclusively identify with their region are not
more likely to support integration as they would see it as diluting their regional identity.
One major aw with this study (for my purposes) is that it doesn’t dierentiate between
the center and periphery. Region here could refer to either the center or the periphery
and so we cannot say if there is greater support for integration from the periphery. This,
no doubt, is built into the design of the study and so it is strange that the article itself
speaks of regionalist parties and ‘Europe of the Regions’ and aims to add to the literature
on regionalist support for European integration (Chacha, 2013, p. 208–9).
My own analysis checks if there are dierences in support for European integration
between people living in the periphery versus those living in the center. I take the regions
of the periphery to be those that have or have had separatist movements or where region-
alist parties have demanded high levels of autonomy. For the UK, this means Scotland and
Northern Ireland, for Spain it is Catalonia and the Basque Community, and for Belgium
it is Flanders. The variables I analyze are amongst those which were discussed in chapter
two. In particular, I look at EU benet, if membership is a good thing, positive or negative
image of the EU, if respondents tend to trust the European parliament, and if respondents
have an exclusively national identity or not. In the graphs below, higher levels always
mean more support (specic or diuse) for the EU. The data for each of these variables
comes from the Eurobarometer from the years 1975 to 2016. Each variable is graphed sep-
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arately for each country. In addition, I conducted a chi-square test of dierence on the
weighted data in each year to statistically test if there were signicant dierences be-
tween the regions. If a statistically signicant dierence at the 0.05 level was found, this
is denoted with an asterisk in the graph. In other words, an asterisk denotes that for that
particular year, for that particular variable, there was a statistically signicant dierence
between the levels in the regions under consideration.
Figure 5.3: Regional dierences in EU support in Belgium
Figure 5.3 shows the level of EU support in Wallonia and Flanders on ve dierent
indicators. On most of the indicators there is little to separate public support from either
of the regions. However, if viability theory is correct, we would expect more support
for the EU from Flanders. This is the case in only one of the indicators (the one which
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asks if EU membership is a good thing). The other indicator which shows a consistent
dierence is the one which asks if the respondent feels identication with the nation, with
Europe, or a mixed identication. For that variable, we see that respondents in Flanders
feel more exclusively national than those in Wallonia. This goes against the prediction of
viability theory that respondents in Flanders should support the EU more strongly. Hence,
in Belgium, we can see that support for viability theory is weak, at best.
Figure 5.4: Regional dierences in EU support in Spain
In the case of Spain, shown in gure 5.4, we see that there is little to dierentiate Cat-
alonia and the Basque community from the rest of Spain in the case of public support for
the EU. In this case, levels of support tend to move in unison, falling or rising together
as the case may be. The only indicator where there is a clear dierence between the re-
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gions and the rest of Spain is the one which asks about national versus European identity.
In both Catalonia and the Basque community, we see that respondents tend to identify
with Europe more, ether having an exclusively European identity or a mixed national
and European identity. In contrast, respondents in the rest of Spain are much more likely
to identify as exclusively Spanish. This dierence is not hard to explain given the his-
tory of separatism in these two regions. It is understandable that respondents would not
identify as Spanish, and since the question only gives the choice of national or European,
many would see themselves as exclusively European or as having a mixed national and
European identity.
Figure 5.5: Regional dierences in EU support in the United Kingdom
The clearest regional dierences in support for the EU are seen in the UK. As seen in
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gure 5.5, respondents in both Scotland and Northern Ireland are more supportive of the
EU than those in England and Wales. There are a couple of interesting trends to note. The
rst is that Northern Ireland is, in general, more supportive of the EU. While Scotland is
signicantly more europhilic than England and Wales, it is closer to the levels of support
seen in the latter than it is to Northern Ireland. This indicates that the Scottish National
Party’s (SNP) enthusiasm for the EU is not shared by the Scottish population. The second
trend which is seen across all indicators is that support levels across the regions under
consideration are, over the last ve years, coming closer together. The trend lines for
the regions are converging and we also see fewer years in the last ve where there are
statistically signicant dierences between the regions. Throughout the UK, we see that
in 2016 just a little less than 50% of respondents thought that EU membership was a good
thing. Of course, this mirrors the eventual vote tally of the Brexit referendum, where 52%
voted to leave the EU (Telegraph, 2016). However, while the Eurobarometer survey data
indicates that attitudes about EU membership were the same across all regions in the UK
(at a little less than 50% saying the EU membership is a good thing), the actual Brexit vote
didn’t mirror this. In Scotland, 62% of voters wanted the UK to remain in the EU while the
corresponding gure for Northern Ireland was 56% (Telegraph, 2016). The Scottish case, at
least, is complicated by the SNP’s calls for the independence of Scotland from the UK. This,
combined with the Brexit vote, leads to a strange set of incentives for the Scottish voter.
A Scottish nationalist who wants independence from the UK would have an incentive to
vote for Brexit in the hope that it would lead to a vote for Scottish independence. On the
other hand, a Scottish unionist would have the opposite incentive, preferring to remain in
the EU because the chances of keeping Scotland in the UK would then be higher. Hence,
the Scottish vote on Brexit, rather than being seen as a straight referendum on the EU,
needs to be considered in the context of the SNP’s push for Scottish independence from
the UK. If my reasoning is correct, it would mean that independence from the UK is less
popular than the SNP’s platform would suggest. Indeed, we can see this play out in the
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general election in the UK. As the British government went to invoke article 50 which
would begin the formal process for Brexit, the SNP renewed calls for holding a second
Scottish independence referendum within a year or two (Washington Post, 2017). Such an
aggressive move for Scottish independence didn’t play well with voters as the SNP lost 19
seats in Scotland in the British general election held in June, 2017.
5.4 Discussion
My analysis of center-periphery dierences in public support for the EU gives some
interesting results. First, it shows that there are important dierences between countries
in how regionalist parties and the residents of these separatist regions perceive and sup-
port the EU. While there are very few dierences in public support for the EU between
the center and periphery in Spain and Belgium, we see greater and statistically signi-
cant dierences in the UK where the Scottish and Northern Irish publics support the EU
more than those of England and Wales. Other researchers have also shown that regional-
ist party responses to Europe are varied and have changed over time. Hence, combining
and analyzing all regionalist parties and partisans in Western Europe, as Jolly (2015) and
Chacha (2013) do, leads to a signicant loss of precision. What might be important for
Catalonia is lost in the general analysis of all regionalist movements in Western Europe.
It is the use of viability theory which leads social scientists to look at regionalist move-
ments in Europe as a whole. At its heart, viability theory is a purely economic theory. It
only says that the EU, as an economic entity, leads to an increase in the equilibrium num-
ber of states by reducing the costs for smaller states. However, the EU is not only an
economic entity, it is also a political one. Just because the economic costs to indepen-
dence have been lowered, it doesn’t mean that the political costs have also been lowered.
And, if we combine this with the fact that dierent countries have dierent political re-
sponses to regionalist movements, it makes a lot of sense to look at these movements in
each country separately rather than generalize for all of Western Europe.
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Viability theory, as applied to the EU by Jolly (2015), would predict that the public
in separatist regions would show more instrumental support for the EU. However, my
analysis shows that this is only true for the UK. In the case of Spain, when we consider
the indicators for instrumental support, we nd that there is not clear dierence between
levels of support in Catalonia, the Basque community and the rest of Spain. For Belgium,
we see where there are signicant dierences, the relationship as to whether the center or
periphery support the EU more changes over time. Hence, we cannot say that Flanders is,
over time, shows more instrumental support for the EU than Wallonia. There are strong
dierences in the more aective measure of support for the EU, the one which asks about
national versus European identity. However, even there, there is no consistent nding
across the three countries. In Belgium, residents of Flanders have a more exclusively na-
tional identity than those of Wallonia. However, this is reversed in Spain where residents
of Catalonia and the Basque community have a more European identity than the rest of
Spain.
My analysis shows that while viability theory is ne as a purely economic theory, it
cannot be applied indiscriminately to all regionalist movements in Western Europe. There
are important historical and political dierences between European countries which need
to be taken into account when speaking of regionalism in the context the European inte-
gration. In the larger context of public support for European integration, we can say that
the regional dimension of politics is dependent on the context. It could provide increased
support from the periphery for European integration on an instrumental basis. However,




No European can be a complete exile in any part of Europe.
Edmund Burke
Letters on a Regicide Peace
In the chapters so far, I have looked at instrumental support for Europe based on eco-
nomic and regional factors as well as support due to growing cognitive mobilization and
postmaterialism. In this chapter, we take a look at a possible national identication and
an emerging European nationalism. Towards this end, I discuss issues of national iden-
tity and take a look at Europe’s ‘others’, specically the American other and the (Muslim)
immigrant other. While many scholars have pointed out that a growing European nation
would (and does) see the United States as its other, a lack of survey data on this issue
makes it dicult to connect it with a European identity. The second theme, that of Mus-
lim immigrants in Europe, lends itself more easily to the kind of analysis I conduct in this
dissertation. Thus far, my research has pointed to the necessity of the legitimization of
EU institutions in the wake of the economic crisis. It is in this context that political mobi-
lization against integration invoke national identity and the loss of national sovereignty.
To combat this, further integration would require the legitimization of current EU insti-
tutions and the integration process. In other words, it would require a kind of ‘thick’
identity or a sense of community.
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6.1 A Question of Identity
Thus far, I have used the term ‘identity’ without giving it much thought. I would like
to step back for just a minute now and analyze this concept further and specify what
I mean by it before continuing. As any casual observer of political science knows, the
use of the term ‘identity’ and the eld of ‘identity studies’ has grown rapidly in the last
few decades. However, even with this rapid growth, there is little agreement about what
the term ‘identity’ actually means and how it should be used (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000;
Fearon, 1999). This follows from the constructivist turn in political science. The old essen-
tialist conceptions of identity, which Brubaker and Cooper refer to as ‘strong’ understand-
ings of identity (2000, p. 10), speaks of identity in the context of bounded homogeneous
groups wherein group membership is not easily changed. Identity is usually decided at
birth and there is little individual choice in the matter. Following the constructivist turn,
identity has come to be seen as much more uid and contingent, with individuals seen as
having multiple identities. However, for Brubaker and Cooper, this represents somewhat
of a problem because identity, as an analytical concept, then ceases to have any power; by
attempting to say too much, identity says nothing at all. Hence, they recommend think-
ing beyond ‘identity’ and taking up new analytical terms (commonality, connectedness,
aect, and so on). James Fearon speaks of much the same fragmentation which has oc-
curred concerning the concept of identity. However, he sees some commonality in the
usage of the term ‘identity’ in the social sciences. According to him, when authors speak
of this term, they are speaking of one of two general meanings (1999, p. 36):
(a) a social category dened by membership rules and allegedly characteristic
attributes or expected behaviors, or (b) a socially distinguishing feature a per-
son takes special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential
(or, of course, both (a) and (b) at once).
For my purposes, I will agree with the rather broad denition provided by Fearon. Specif-
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ically, I am interested in political identities, and this refers largely to part (a) of the above
denition. As such, my work looks to a ‘we’ rather than an ‘I’ and looks at group mem-
bership and attributes, symbols, and values shared by members of the group, all in the
context of Europe. And yet, as Sophie Duchesne (2008) points out, all this talk of a Euro-
pean identity presupposes the existence of a stable polity that people could identify with
or the existence of a European identity as such. Mostly, this is not the case. In the case of
Europe, we are dealing with how people come to identify with an emerging polity. And
at this time, it is not really clear what sort of identication this is (or will be). For Duch-
esne, shelving identity in favor of identication can help shed light on the process rather
than encourage debates about what has not yet come to pass. In this spirit, I propose
to study collective identication with Europe. In her analysis, Duchesne identies three
processes and uses the works of Norbert Elias, Ronald Inglehart, and Benedict Anderson
in order to develop three alternative, yet complementary, processes by which to think
about changes in identication.1 In his chapter, I take up the national question which is
based on Benedict Anderson’s work. For Anderson (2006), the nation is an entity which
is at once imagined, limited, and sovereign. Hence, there can be no two sovereign nations
within the same territory. This model, as Duchesne rightly points out, implies a competi-
tion between Europe and its member states for the loyalty of its citizens and this suggests
a tension between national and European identication (Duchesne, 2008, p. 405). As my
analysis in this chapter shows, this tension does exist and provides opposition to further
integration. However, my larger concern here is not so much the competition between a
national and European identication. Rather, it is the creation of a European sense of self
in opposition to the American and immigrant other.
1My own work is related to this in many ways. For her project, an important aspect is the transition
from national to European identication. Hence, she looks at an emerging European identication in the
context of established national identities. For my purposes, this inter-play between national and European
identication is of lesser importance.
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6.2 Europe’s Others
Much of the work on nationalism and national identity focuses on the necessity of the
other by which the sense of self is created (Hobsbawm, 1992; Colley, 1992; Smith, 1992;
Sahlins, 1991). In saying this, I do not wish to fall into the trap of essentialism wherein
there are some immutable dierences between self and other. Indeed, there need not
even be any objective linguistic or cultural dierences. What is necessary, however, is the
“subjective experience of dierence” (Sahlins, 1991, pp. 270–1). In the case of Europe as a
whole, there are two signicant others: the American other and the (Muslim) immigrant
other. In this section, I provide a theoretical basis for why these could lead to a European
identity.
6.2.1 The American Other
Starting with anti-Americanism, two questions come immediately to mind: what is
it? and how can it contribute to an emerging identication with Europe? To answer the
rst question, a short review of the literature on this subject makes it clear that anti-
Americanism is not a rational disagreement with the policies of the United States. Rather,
as Paul Hollander mentions, is is a “deep-seated, emotional predisposition” to negatively
perceive the United States (Hollander, 2004, 12). In this way, it is a prejudice that often
lacks “distinct reasons or concrete causes” (Markovits, 2009, 17). This narrative is not lim-
ited to any one side of the political spectrum but exists from the left to the right (Markovits,
2009, 28). And it is not a new phenomenon; as many observers have noted, there is a
long tradition of European Anti-Americanism, starting from images of the New World
until the present (Markovits, 2009; Ceaser, 2004). But what exactly does this have to do
with identication with Europe? Back in 1954, Hannah Arendt worried that a growing
anti-Americanism might become the beginning of a European nationalism.2. For Arendt,
2These lectures and essays have been subsequently published in Essays in Understanding 1930–1954
(1994). For Arendt’s views on anti-Americanism and a European identity, see pages 409–427
76
Europe projected on to the United States its fears of technology and modernity (espe-
cially the evils of technology, such as the nuclear bomb) and a growing consumer culture
(signifying a lack of ‘real’ culture based on a long historical tradition). This, coupled
with the growing wealth of the United States and its far-reaching foreign policy, became
a focal point around which European anti-Americanism was based.3. As Arendt saw it,
anti-Americanism holds such a potential to become the focal point of a European identity
because the Europeanism it would produce would closely resemble the Americanism it
sought to confront. Hence, Americanism and Europeanism would become two compet-
ing ideologies because of the fact that they resembled each other.4 It is striking, then, to
see that the protests of February 15, 2003—protests against the US-led war on Iraq and,
ostensibly, against the United States itself—signaled to many observers the birth of the
European nation (Markovits, 2009, ch. 6).
In spite of the vast amount of theoretical literature on anti-Americanism, there are
surprisingly few statistical analyses of the phenomenon. Of those statistical analyses re-
lating anti-Americanism to a European identity, I have found only one, that by David
Michael Green (2012). The major reason for this lack is that there is no good survey
data on the subject. Green himself tests out the thesis that European identity is based
on anti-Americanism by looking at data from the International Social Survey Program
and the Eurobarometer. Even with this dataset, the analyses that Green can conduct are
limited. On the one hand, he tests the thesis that European identity would be stronger
when more people opposed US policies, as say under George W. Bush. The other analysis
looks at Eurobarometer data and at perceptions of if people see themselves as Europeans
and their perceptions of the US role for peace in the world. In both these analyses, the
results are, at best, inconclusive. On the one hand, the problem is theoretical. If I am cor-
rect in that anti-Americanism is based on prejudice rather than rational perceptions of US
3For further analysis of Arendt’s thoughts on this, see Rensmann (2006)
4On a related note, looking at the process of identity formation in Spain and France, Peter Sahlins nds
something similar. He notes that the sense of dierence between self and other is strongest where there is
some history of cooperation and relatedness (Sahlins, 1991).
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policy, it would follow that the actions of the US government would have a rather small
impact in shaping this prejudice. Hence, means-testing the levels of public attachment to
Europe across various US administrations would, by itself, not conclusively prove that a
growing anti-Americanism leads to an identication with Europe. There have been other,
more modest statistical analyses done on anti-Americanism in Europe. Of those, the one
by Heiko Beyer is promising because he combines the statistical analysis of Pew survey
data while also providing theoretical mechanisms (those of projection and cognitive dis-
sonance) for anti-Americanism (2012). In his work on anti-Americanism in Germany, he
also devises survey instruments designed to measure the prevalence of anti-Americanism
(2013). Following this, I think a more fruitful approach is the combination of statistical
analysis with a theory of the process by which anti-American sentiment could lead to
growing identication with Europe.
6.2.2 The Immigrant Other
Here, it is not my aim to take a look at the historical interactions between the Islamic
empires, most notably the Ottoman empire, and Christian Europe. There are a number of
good accounts in international relations theory of how, through these interactions, Islam
came to be seen as Europe’s other (Neumann, 1999; O’Brien, 2009). Rather, my aim is to
study the current European prejudice against Muslim immigrants.5 A couple of common
features with anti-Americanism can be observed: (a) both prejudices have little basis in
reality, (b) both exist across the political spectrum, from the left to the right. The Muslim
in Europe, and in much of the developed world, is caught in a good / bad binary where the
good Muslim (moderate, non-violent, tolerant, plural, committed to women’s equality) is
a friend while the bad Muslim (the opposite, in every respect, of the good Muslim) is the
enemy, despite the fact that no Muslims actually t these stereotypes (Mahmood, 2004;
5Such has been the success of the radical right that the terms Muslim and immigrant have come to
be used interchangeably in almost all popular and academic discourse (Yılmaz, 2012). Indeed, as Yılmaz
mentions, it is due to the eorts of the radical right that discourse on immigrants has come to be seen as a
cultural issue by the left as well as the right.
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Shryock, 2010). In Europe, it is no secret that the Muslim immigrant has become the
radical right’s favorite punching bag. What is surprising is that a good number of leftist
intellectuals have also fallen into this trap. Consider, for instance, public statement signed
by twelve intellectuals (including Salman Rushdie, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Bernard-Henry
Lévy) in the wake of the Danish cartoons controversy.6 In it, something called ‘Islamism’
(purportedly something to do with the religion) is equated with fascism, Stalinism and
Nazism and the term ‘Islamophobia’ is disparaged as one which confuses “criticism of
Islam” with the “stigmatization of those who believe in it”. Reading it, I was left to wonder
how it would be possible for me to call your entire belief system totalitarian and not
manage to stigmatize you.
This is but one of many instances of Islamophobia coming from leftist intellectuals.
However, it is the radical right parties in Western Europe which are truly at the forefront of
this phenomenon. As we have briey seen in the section on postfunctionalism, Hooghe
and Marks contend that the politicization of national identities by radical right parties
constitutes a large impediment to further European integration. However, contrary to
this argument, my hunch is that the success of the radical right parties in Western Europe
is in large part due to anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment within the populace.
Hence, the success of radical right parties in Europe signals the shared sentiment of anti-
Islamism across many countries and so rise of these parties need not portend the end of
further integration. While it is hard to actually prove this argument, a quick survey of
the foreign and security policy of these radical right parties shows that my argument is
not completely o the mark. As we have seen, most radical right parties are nativist, in
that they resist the immigration of those who they suspect to be unable or unwilling to
integrate. Hence their specic focus on Muslim immigrants as they are portrayed as being
unable to integrate as Islam is undemocratic and anti-minority (Betz, 2007). All these
parties agree that Europe is a civilization based on Greek, Roman, and Christian values
6The statement is titled “Together Facing the New Totalitarianism" and can be viewed at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4764730.stm
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and that the EU should eventually include all Christian or occidental nations of Eastern
Europe (Liang, 2007, p. 17). However, their view of the EU is limited in that they don’t
support a European super-state, rather a “Europe of peoples based on ethnicity” (Liang,
2007, p. 12). At the same time, most parties look to form alliances at the EU level and
there are two party groups in the EU parliament with members from radical right parties
(these are the ‘Identity, Tradition, and Sovereignty Group’ and the ‘Union for Europe of
the Nations’). Hence, as Liang mentions, these parties subscribe to a globalized nationalist
agenda. The call for a halt to European integration is going hand-in-hand with greater
cooperation between such parties at the European level.7 This is all well and good, but
does it really point to an identication with Europe as such? Couldn’t people vote for the
far-right because they feared economic competition with immigrants? Or just because
they had little trust in the political system?
These hypotheses were tested by Pippa Norris on her work on the radical right. She
found that public support for the radical right comes from both the middle and lower
classes (Norris, 2005, p. 147). Hence, the rise of the radical right cannot simply be at-
tributed to growing unemployment. Those who vote for the radical right are indeed less
trusting of political institutions and this lends some credence to the protest vote thesis
(Norris, 2005, p. 164). However, the strongest support for radical right parties comes from
those who have a “negative attitude toward immigration, refugees, multiculturalism, and
economic equality” (Norris, 2005, p. 182). This is despite the fact that there is no rela-
tionship between ethnic diversity in a given country and the level of radical right support
(Norris, 2005, p. 185). A similar conclusion was reached by Strabac and Listhaug (2008)
who found that anti-Muslim sentiment in a given country has little to do with the actual
percentage of Muslims living in that country.
7One manifestation of such cooperation is the Contact Forum for European Patriotic National Parties
and Movements with a permanent oce in Vienna (Liang, 2007, p. 13).
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6.2.2.1 Connecting Immigration and European Integration
As identied by Kentmen-Cin and Erisen (2017, p. 4), there are four main trends in
research on anti-immigrant attitudes and public opinion about the EU. The rst looks at
cultural and identity threats posed by immigrants. The main hypothesis in this theme is
that those who see immigrants as a threat would oppose further integration because of the
EU’s open border policy which allows the free movement of people within the Schengen
area. The second theme looks specically at attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. The
research here is split into two distinct dimensions and the rst asks whether people are
willing to accept predominantly Muslim countries as EU members. The second dimension
looks as attitudes towards Muslim immigrants and support for European integration. This
second dimension is very closely related to the rst theme of immigrants posing a cultural
threat, specically because the the conation of the terms immigrant and Muslim in the
European context. The third theme focuses on perceived economic and security threats
posed by immigrants while the fourth theme looks at the attitudes of immigrants towards
the EU (Kentmen-Cin and Erisen, 2017, p. 4). Here, I focus on the rst trend, that linking
anti-immigrant attitudes and public opinion about the EU.
McLaren (2002) makes a strong argument for the primacy of perceived cultural threats
while examining attitudes towards European integration. This is based two main con-
tentions. The rst is that when evaluating public policy proposals, individuals look at
societal-level needs rather than performing a personal cost-benet analysis. The second
focuses on the primacy of “symbolic politics” and contends that opposition to the EU in-
volves perceived threats to the primacy of the nation-state (McLaren, 2002, pp. 554–5).
Indeed, McLaren’s own analysis of Eurobarometer data says that opposition towards the
EU is based on the hostility towards other cultures. The argument here is not that factors
such as economics, cognitive mobilization and postmaterialism don’t matter. Rather its
that symbolic factors better explain support for European integration (McLaren, 2002, p.
564). McLaren’s analysis doesn’t focus on immigrants in particular but rather minorities
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in the country. The (reasonable) assumption here is that when survey respondents speak
of minorities, they are thinking of immigrants. Other studies in this vein have extended
this model of perceived cultural threats to focus specically on immigrants. Using data
from their own survey, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) nd that negative out-group
attitudes are a very strong predictor for opposition towards the EU. As the EU is asso-
ciated with open borders, those with negative attitudes about non-nationals will oppose
EU integration. Their study also conrms the importance of economic factors as well as
domestic politics in determining EU related attitudes.
In their study of religion, anti-immigrant attitudes and support for European integra-
tion amongst European youth, Nelsen and Guth (2003) connect a number of important
strands in the literature. They nd that religion, particularly Catholicism, promotes a Eu-
ropean we-feeling which leads to support for the EU. They note that the Catholic church
has long tended to “supranational solutions to political and social problems” and the EU
is just the latest manifestation of this tendency (Nelsen and Guth, 2003, p. 91). They nd
that Catholics support the EU more than either Orthodox or Protestants. As a group,
Catholics, Protestants and the Orthodox are more supportive of the EU while the secular
youth were the most Eurosceptic. Amongst young people, they conrm the ndings of
previous research in that those who support immigration view the EU favorably. How-
ever, their ndings point to an interesting tension. If we accept that religious Christians
are more supportive of the EU than atheists and that this is because of Europe’s Christian
heritage and the Catholic church’s supranationalism, we might reasonably expect them
to be against immigration from outside Europe as this would reduce Europe’s Christian
character. Yet, their ndings point out that this might not be the case.
Tillman (2013) connects anti-immigrant attitudes with authoritarianism. Both the EU
and immigrants represent a threat to the social cohesion of the nation-state and are thus
opposed by those with authoritarian attitudes.8 In a similar vein, Luedtke (2005) nds
8Authoritarian attitudes are operationalized as those who have respect for authority, believe there is
one true religion, who have not attended a political demonstration, and those who believe homosexuals
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that those with an exclusively national identity are more likely to oppose the harmoniza-
tion of a EU-wide immigration policy, preferring that immigration policy should remain
under national control. In this study, attitudes about immigration were also a signicant
predictor with those who opposed further immigration also opposing the harmonization
of immigration policy (Luedtke, 2005, p. 98). McLaren (2007) argues for the importance
of the immigration population in a given country. The argument here is that in countries
where there are a large number of immigrants, we would see more opposition towards
integration. McLaren (2007) shows that this is the case for opposition to the inclusion
of Turkey in the EU. Carrying this argument forward, I argue that in thinking about Eu-
ropean integration more generally, perceptions of the level of immigration in a country
matter. Across all countries these have consistently been higher than actual levels of im-
migration and we would expect that those with higher perceptions of immigration would
be more opposed to further integration.
As seen in this short review, much of the research shows a tension between identi-
cation with the nation and identication with the EU. The latter is oftentimes blamed for
any perceived increases in immigration and thus diluting the national character. In the
following sections, my analysis of European Social Survey and Eurobarometer data shows
a strong link between attitudes towards immigration and the EU.
6.3 Hypotheses and Method
Given the theoretical discussion and literature review above, we can postulate a few
testable hypotheses. By allowing the free movement of people across within its borders,
the EU is seen as leading to an increase in immigration both from within and outside
Europe. Hence, we would expect those with negative attitudes about immigrants to be
opposed to further integration. We would also expect that those who would prefer lower
should not be allowed to adopt children Tillman (2013, p. 577). For his analysis, Tillman uses data from the
European Values Survey.
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levels of immigration would be opposed to further integration. When we consider the
perception about levels of immigration, we can expect those who perceive high levels to
oppose further integration. However, it is important to note a mediating eect here. If
one has negative attitudes about immigrants and perceives high levels of immigrants, one
would be more opposed to EU integration. Hence, we would expect the perception of the
level of immigration to works in interaction with the attitudes about immigrants. The
hypotheses are more formally stated below.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with negative attitudes about immigrants oppose
further EU integration.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who reject more immigration also oppose further EU
integration.
Hypothesis 3: The interaction of perceptions about levels of immigration and
attitudes about immigrants are a signicant predictor of attitudes about EU in-
tegration.
Comparing data about immigration levels and perception of immigration, we see in
table 6.1 that in every country in the EU-15, perceptions of immigration far exceed actual
levels of immigration. In table 6.1, the rst two columns give us levels of immigration. The
rst column is the percentage of the population not born in that country, the second is the
percentage of population in the country which was not born in Europe. This data is for
2016 and is sourced from Eurostat. The next three columns give data of the average level
of the perception of the proportion of foreigners in the country. This data is from rounds
one and seven of the European Social Survey (ESS). As we can see, in every country except
France, people think that the number of foreigners in the country has increased.9 In all
countries, people think there are a lot more foreigners than there really are.10 Hence, the
perception of immigration is much more than the actual level of immigration.
9In the Netherlands and in Sweden, this increase is not signicant.
10This is not surprising as immigrants are over-represented in urban areas and in the media.
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Table 6.1: The perception and reality of immigration in the EU-15.
Percentage foreign born in 2016 Opinion of Percentage
Country Total Foreign Non-EU born In 2002 In 2014 Dierence
Austria 18.16 9.95 20.26 26.72 6.46∗
Belgium 16.32 8.65 23.11 29.07 5.96∗
Denmark 11.16 7.36 10.14 13.57 3.42∗
France 11.84 8.54 27.78 26.04 -1.73∗
Finland 6.00 3.83 6.73 9.48 2.75∗
Greece 11.32 8.07 20.12
Germany 13.27 7.98 19.88 22.76 2.88∗
Ireland 16.90 5.31 14.60 20.38 5.78∗
Italy 9.74 6.73 17.57
Luxembourg 45.22 11.42 40.58
Netherlands 12.11 8.84 23.53 23.83 0.30
Portugal 8.44 6.19 20.78 24.79 4.01∗
Spain 12.74 8.53 16.23 21.84 5.62∗
Sweden 17.00 11.63 20.29 20.63 0.35
United Kingdom 13.30 8.33 23.86 27.27 3.41∗
Note: ∗p<0.05. Immigration data is from Eurostat, opinion data from ESS.
Thus far, the working assumption of this chapter has been the opposition to the Mus-
lim immigrant other. However, as table 6.1 tells us, not all immigrants are created equal.
The open-borders policy of the EU has resulted in large (though smaller than hoped for)
mobility within countries of the EU. Hence, a signicant portion of the foreign-born pop-
ulation in the EU-15 countries comes from other countries within Europe. This distinction
is useful for analyzing the creation of an aective European identity. If my reasoning is
correct, those who identify with Europe would be more welcoming of immigrants from
within Europe than from outside Europe, while those who identify only with the nation-
state would not view any immigration into the country favorably. This leads me to a
fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: Individuals who identify with Europe would be more favor-
able to immigration from within Europe while individuals identifying with the
nation-state would not be favorable to any immigration into the country.
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6.3.1 Measures and Data
In order to test the rst three hypotheses, I use data from the European Social Survey.
This survey has been conducted bi-annually in European countries since 2002. Hence we
have a total of seven rounds of data. I limit my analysis to the EU-15 countries. All fteen
countries are present in each round of the ESS with the following exceptions: Austria
is missing round six, Greece is missing in rounds three, six and seven, Italy is missing
in rounds three, four, ve and seven, and nally Luxembourg is missing in rounds three
to seven. Compared to the Eurobarometer surveys, one of the limitations of the ESS is
that we have a rather small time-series of seven rounds over twelve years. However, the
advantage for using it in research about attitudes towards immigration is that the ESS has
asked a battery of questions related to immigration in every round.
This group of six questions falls under two main categories: are immigrants good /
bad for the country and should we allow many / few immigrants into the country. The
rst set consists of three questions asking if immigrants are good / bad for the country’s
economy and cultural life and if immigrants make the country a better / worse place to
live. Responses to these questions were recorded on an eleven point scale (0 = Bad for
country, 10 = good for country). The second set of questions asks if we should allow
many / few immigrants and consists of three questions which ask allow immigrants of
the same ethnicity, allow immigrants of a dierent ethnicity, and allow immigrants from
poorer countries outside Europe. Responses were recorded on a four point scale (1 = Allow
many, 4 = Allow None). These questions relate to two distinct dimensions on immigration
in the EU. This is conrmed by conducting a principal component analysis, the factor
loadings of which are seen in table 6.2 and the scree plot for which is show in gure 6.1.
The two sets of questions forms two distinct dimension, one related to attitudes about
the impact of immigrants and the second related to the control of immigration. These
questions were combined into two indices which were then standardized on a scale of
zero to one, with zero being against immigrants and immigrations while a value of one
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supports immigrants. The scale related to the impact of immigrants has a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.85 and the scale related to allowing immigration has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.9.
The scales form two of the independent variables in the analysis which follows.
Table 6.2: Factor loadings for the Principal Component Analysis of attitudes about immi-
grants.
Factor 1 Factor 2
Good / Bad for Economy -0.27 0.81
Undermine / Enhance Cultural Life -0.25 0.85
Make Country Better / Worse -0.29 0.84
Allow Same Ethnicity 0.86 -0.25
Allow Dierent Ethnicity 0.87 -0.35
Allow from Poorer Countries 0.84 -0.33
Figure 6.1: Scree plot of Principal Component Analysis
The dependent variable in the analysis is a measure of support for further integration.
The ESS questions asks respondents if European integration should go further or has gone
too far. Responses are recorded on an eleven point scale (0 = unication has gone too far,
10 = Unication should go further). This question was asked in rounds two to seven of
the ESS, hence my analysis is only of six rounds of ESS data from 2004 to 2014.
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Hypothesis three tests if the perception of immigration is a signicant predictor. The
independent variable is the response to the question, “Of every 100 people in the country,
how many were born outside”. Hence, this variable is the percentage of immigrants in
the country as perceived by the respondent. This question was only asked in rounds
one and seven of the ESS, hence in testing hypothesis three, I only use data from round
seven. Finally, two other demographic controls were included in the analysis, the age
and educational levels of the respondent. The educational level was measured on a seven
point scale (1 = less than lower secondary, 7 = higher tertiary).
I test the fourth hypothesis, that about attitudes towards immigration from within
and outside Europe, using data from the Eurobarometer surveys. Since Eurobarometer
82.3 (in 2014), there have been two question regarding this topic. The questions ask about
immigration from other EU member states and of immigration of people from outside
the EU. Responses are recorded on a four point scale (1 = Very Negative, 2 = Somewhat
Negative, 3 = Somewhat Positive, 4 = Very positive). For these questions, we have data
from three surveys between 2014 and 2016.
6.4 Analysis
Hypotheses one to three are tested using mixed eects regression as responses are
clustered by country and by year. The models used are similar to those in chapter four,
except for the assumption of normality for the dependent variable. The results of the
analysis are shown in table 6.3. Model one is a simple mixed-eects regression of atti-
tudes towards integration on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. The second
model adds the demographic controls of age and educational level. Model three has the
interaction term of the perception of the percentage of immigrants in the country with
the index which measures perceptions towards immigrants. Finally, the fourth model has
the interaction term as well as the demographic controls.
As we see in model 1, the attitudes towards immigrants are signicant predictors of
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Table 6.3: Mixed eects analysis of attitudes towards immigration and European integra-
tion
Dependent variable:
European Integration: Can go further
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Allow / Reject Immigrants 0.110∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Immigrants Good / Bad 0.394∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014)
Percentage of Immigrants 0.001 0.001
(0.0002) (0.0002)




Educational Level 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.0004) (0.001)
Constant 0.230∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 110,985 110,985 20,215 20,215
Countries 15 15 12 12
Rounds 6 6 1 1
Log Likelihood 3,939.836 3,986.392 1,298.148 1,296.341
Akaike Inf. Crit. −7,867.672 −7,956.785 −2,582.295 −2,574.682
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −7,809.969 −7,879.848 −2,526.896 −2,503.454
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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attitudes towards European integration. Those who see immigrants as good for the coun-
try also say that integration can go further. The same is true of those who say that we
should allow more immigrants into the country. This eect remains signicant when we
add the demographic controls. Both the age and the educational level are signicant pre-
dictors as well, with support for further integration decreasing with age and increasing
with the educational level. Models 3 and 4 are an analysis of the seventh round of the
ESS. They add the variable about the perception of the level of immigration to models 1
and 2. The results show that while the perception of immigration levels is, by itself, not
a signicant predictor attitudes towards further integration, its interaction with attitudes
about immigrants is. This interaction eect is shown graphically in gure 6.2. We see
that the perception of immigration has a moderating eect on support for integration.
When perceptions of immigration rise, we see that even those who think immigrants are
good for the country will decrease their support for integration. This analysis largely
conrms the rst three hypotheses of this chapter and thus conrms previous research
into immigration and attitudes towards integration.
For testing the fourth hypothesis, I have used pooled Eurobarometer data from 2014–
2016. The dierences in the percentage of respondents who view immigration from within
and from outside the EU is shown graphically in gure 6.3. This is graphed by how the re-
spondents see themselves: as European, European and national, national and European or
national only. We see that less than half (46%) of those who see themselves as exclusively
national view immigrants from the EU positively while only 27%view non-EU immigrants
positively. Hence, more than half do not want any immigration into the country. On the
other hand, 79% of those who identify exclusively as European view immigrants from EU
countries positively while 59% view non-EU immigrants positively.
This analysis of EU and non-EU immigrants leads to two main results. The rst is that
support for all immigration increases we move from an exclusively national to a more
mixed or exclusively European identity. Secondly, the percentage who view EU immi-
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Figure 6.2: Eect plot for the interaction term in Model 4.
Figure 6.3: Identication with Europe and attitudes towards immigration.
grants favorably is signicantly larger than those who view non-EU immigration favor-
ably. However, both these measure are highly correlated and increase almost uniformly
from those with an exclusively national identication to those with a mixed national and
91
European identication. This analysis provides mixed support for hypothesis four. On
the one hand, support for EU immigration increases as one identies as more European.
On the other hand, the dierence between support for EU immigrants and non-EU im-
migrants stays the same across all levels of identication (at about 20%). So we see that
support for non-EU immigration also increases at about the same rate as that of EU im-
migrants as one identies as more European.
6.5 Discussion
The rst part of my analysis largely conrms past research on attitudes towards im-
migration and support for European integration. Using ESS data, I have shown that indi-
viduals who are more supportive of immigrants and of accepting more immigrants into
the country also tend to think that European integration should go further. This is largely
in line with what previous research has shown (Kentmen-Cin and Erisen, 2017). My anal-
ysis has also shown that perceptions about immigration levels in the country also matter,
though only in an interaction with attitudes about immigrants. If people perceive there to
be more immigrants in the country, they tend to think that integration should slow down
or stop.
In this chapter, I have also argued that the Muslim immigrant is possibly seen as an
‘other’ which could form the basis for an aective European identity, a European national-
ism if you will. The fact that immigrants from EU countries are seen much more positively
than immigrants from outside the EU points towards a conrmation of this hypothesis.
However, support for all immigrants tends to rise as we more from a national to a Euro-
pean identity. Hence, one could make the argument that it is a sense of cosmopolitanism,
not a nascent European identity which is driving this change. Much more research is





At the start of this dissertation, I suggested that the Kantian idea of Europe, that of
Europe as a federation of republics, is an important idea behind the EU. I now relate the
results of my empirical analysis back to this idea. As I have mentioned, for Kant the ‘spirit
of commerce’ played an important role in keeping the federation together as it created
interdependence between members states and so ensured peace. The EU has certainly
fullled this in creating a common market, a common currency and removing barriers
to trade. Much of the promise of the EU and its predecessor institutions was economic
and in the past it has mostly delivered on this promise.1 The question which needs to be
asked is if the EU can survive long periods of economic crisis. It is no secret that in a
lot of the EU countries real incomes for most people have remained stagnant in the the
last thirty years. However, with the recent nancial crisis, we have seen a fall in real
incomes and a destruction of wealth as housing prices have collapsed. A few (Southern
European) countries have been hardest hit by this crisis. The question then is this: does
the EU, as an institution and as the manifestation of the Kantian idea of Europe, remain
viable if the economic disparity between and within the EU countries doesn’t end? I argue
that the answer to this question is no. The neofunctionalist response to the crisis has
1I am not making the argument here that the EU was the cause of the high levels of economic growth in
the decades after World War II. However, I am making the argument that the EU’s predecessor institutions
certainly did benet from this rapid economic growth. Indeed, many contend that were it not for these
fortuitous set of economic circumstances, the European Community might not have survived its early years
(Judt, 1996).
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been further integration and harmonization in banking and nance. This has meant the
imposition of further rules on member states as related to national debt and other facets
of economic policy. As Kant rejected the move towards an international state (something
that neofunctionalists tend towards), further integration in these areas might well signal
an end of the Kantian idea of Europe. If the answer to any crisis is further integration, we
are well on the way towards a European superstate.
The move towards an international state also leads to opposition within member
states; the opposition is to what people in these states see as undue interference in matters
which should be decided by the nation-state, hence a loss of state sovereignty (this forms
the basis for the explanation given by post-functionalists). The relation between economic
indicators and public opinion in Europe is tenuous at best because the most commonly
used indicators (GDP, ination, unemployment, trade, etc) do not accurately capture how
people feel about their own economic situation. And, if integration proceeds further, the
post-functionalists might well be correct in the opposition towards integration will be
driven by aect rather than interest.
Revised modernization theory itself depends on economic development. If, instead
of economic development we are faced with stagnation, it is unclear how values change
and how it aects support for political institutions. For (Inglehart and Norris, 2017), the
answer lies in declining levels of existential security. As they rightly point out, much of
the developed world has seen a relative decline in its standard of living. However, except
in the countries hardest hit by the nancial crisis, a relative decline has not meant an
absolute decline in the standard of living. Even if real incomes haven’t increased in the
last thirty years, people are still not starving in say Germany or Sweden. Hence it seems
a little strange to say that these countries are experiencing declining levels of existential
security. It is true that within countries, the proportion of postmaterialists hasn’t risen
in the last three decades. However, we have not seen a large move towards materialist
values either. It is stagnation which best captures the trend of the last thirty years.
94
What does this mean for the Kantian idea of Europe? Rising levels of support for the
EU due to cognitive mobilization and rising postmaterialism are the best way to ensure
the survival of this idea. However, for reasons mentioned above, this doesn’t seem likely.
Both cognitive mobilization and postmaterialism are a product of revised modernization
theory. This, in turn, depends on economic development. If we are in a period of economic
stagnation rather than development, this doesn’t bode well for the future of the Kantian
idea.
Europe as a federation of peoples is an integral part of the Kantian idea. The EU itself
made much of this idea when it signaled a move towards a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in
the mid-1990s. However, the promise was proven false as there was very little autonomy
gained by the regions vis-à-vis the nation-state. This explain some of the changes we have
seen in regionalist party attitudes towards the EU. However, this party family, as a whole,
still remains more positive towards the EU than other party families. But their support
of the EU is oftentimes not shared by their constituents. As I have shown in chapter
ve, there is not much dierence in public support for the EU between the center and
periphery. The center-periphery opposition, an important cleavage in national politics, is
not present when looking at support for the EU.
Finally, I have considered the possibility of the creation of a European ‘self’ as opposed
to an ‘other’. The existence of such a ‘self’ is a signal of a nascent European nationalism.
This, in turns, means the end of the Kantian idea of Europe. As I have argued in the
introduction, a European nation-state is antithetical to the idea of Europe as a federation
of peoples. However, if the EU is to survive, it might need the support of a European
nationalism and this means a Burkean conception of Europe. With the recent nancial
crisis, further integration was portrayed as the only way forward. Politicians portrayed
it as a matter of the survival of the union: Europe must integrate further or it will perish.
My argument is that the institutions resulting from this kind of integration will need an
aective sense of attachment if they are to be seen as legitimate by the people. In chapter
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six, I try and answer if we are actually seeing a sense of this kind of aective attachment
towards the EU. This sense of attachment comes in opposition to the Muslim immigrant.
The nature of this question makes it hard to test using survey data. In addition to this, the
question dierentiating between EU and non-EU immigrants is a fairly recent addition to
the Eurobarometer surveys and so a long time-series isn’t available to check for changes
over time. Hence, my empirical results to this question of an aective European identity
are inconclusive. There remains much work to be done in answering the questions I have
posed in this dissertation.
7.1 Limitations and Directions for Future Research
One of the biggest limitations of this inquiry is the reliance on survey data. One can
make the argument that the kinds of questions I have raised in this dissertation cannot
eectively be answered by using survey data, that aective attachment to a political com-
munity cannot be measured using public opinion surveys. I would say that this may be
party true, nationally representative surveys do give us a picture of how people feel. The
big advantage of using these surveys is that they can give us a view of changes over time.
And the use of these surveys can be complemented with discourse analysis. The analysis
of public discourse on social media and even the news media can indeed give us a better
understanding of the questions I have sought to answer. Future research into these ques-
tions must supplement survey data with the kind of discourse analysis I have suggested
here.
In this inquiry, my questions are revolved around a certain idea of Europe and I have
given short shrift to other ideas of Europe. A more complete discussion of the various ideas
of Europe and their relation to one another is well warranted. The claims I am making
about the Kantian idea of Europe are theoretical claims. However, I am using empirical
analyses in order to support these claims. The link between my empirical analysis and
my theoretical claims is not yet very well developed. Much work needs to be done in this
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area as well.
Finally, the survey series I have analyzed in this dissertation contain many more mea-
sures related to support for the EU. They also contain many measures which could serve
as independent variables in the regression analyses I have done. Of course, it is impossi-
ble for any one inquiry to analyze all the variables. However, there does need to be more
work done to see if there are better measures of support for the EU and if there are other,
better variables and indices which explain this support.
The eld of research into public support for the EU is vast and is growing at a rapid
pace. One of the reasons for this interest is that the view of the EU as sui generis has
never truly gone away. In my dissertation I have considered this view as well. However,
my conclusions lead me to say that perhaps it is time that we also look at the EU through





Survey questions used in the analysis
Question wordings for the variables from the Eurobarometer surveys, the European
Social Survey and the World Values Survey have been used in the analysis.
The following questions from the Eurobarometer measure public support for the EU
and are used as the dependent variable in the analysis.
BENEFIT Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has
on balance beneted or not from being a member of the European Community (com-
mon market)?
• Answers recorded on a binary scale (Beneted / Not Beneted)
EU MEMBERSHIP Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership
of the European Community (common markter is . . . ?
• A good thing
• Neither good nor bad
• A bad thing
IMAGE In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly






TRUST For each of EU institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to
trust it? (Answers are recorded on a binary scale: Tend to trust / Tend not to trust).
• European Parliament
• European Commission
• European Central Bank
FEEL In the near future, do you see yourself as . . . ?
• (Nationality) only
• (Nationality) and European
• European and (Nationality)
• European only
The following question from the European Social Survey measures public support for
the EU and are used as the dependent variable in the analysis.
UNIFICATION Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unica-
tion should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what
number on the scale best describes your position?
• Answers recorded on a 11-point scale (0 = Unication already gone too far, 10
= Unication should go further)
The following question from the WVS/EVS measures public support for the EU and
are used as the dependent variable in the analysis.
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Moving on to the independent variables used in the analysis, the following questions
from the ESS capture attitudes towards immigrants coming into the country.
SAME ETHNICITY Now, using this card, to what extent do you think (country) should
allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most (country) people to come and
live here?
DIFFERENT ETHNICITY How about people of a dierent race or ethnic group from
most (country) people?
POOR COUNTRY How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?




The following questions, from the ESS, look at whether the respondent views immi-
gration positively / negatively.
ECONOMY Would you say it is generally bad or good for (country’s) economy that peo-
ple come to live here from other countries?
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• Answers recorded on a 11-point scale (0 = Bad for economy, 10 = Good for
economy)
CULTURE And, using this card, would you say that (country’s) cultural life is generally
undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
• Answers recorded on a 11-point scale (0 = Cultural life undermined, 10 = Cul-
tural life enriched)
BETTER Is (country) made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live
here from other countries?
• Answers recorded on a 11-point scale (0 = Worse place to live, 10 = Better place
to live)
The following question, from the ESS, looks at perception of immigration levels in the
country.
NUMBER Out of every 100 people living in (country), how many do you think were
born outside (country)?
The next two questions from the Eurobarometer ask about immigration from within
and outside the EU.
IMMIGRATION EU Does the following statements evokes a positive or a negative feel-
ing for you: Immigration of people from other EU Member States.
IMMIGRATION NON-EU Does the following statements evokes a positive or a nega-






The next three variables measure interest in politics. These are from the Eurobarom-
eter surveys.
INTEREST To what extent would you say you are interested in politics?
• A great deal
• To some extent
• Not much
• Not at all
DISCUSSION When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political




PERSUADE When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever nd yourself persuading your
friends, relatives, or fellow workers to share your views? If so, does this happen . . . ?
• Often
• From time to time
• Rarely
• Never
The next questions is a measure of value orientation (materialist or postmaterialist).
It is asked in both the Eurobarometer and the WVS / EVS.
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VALUE ORIENTATION There is a lot of talk these days about what this country’s goals
should be for the next ten or fteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals
that dierent people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which
of them you yourself consider to be most important in the long run ? And what
would be your second choice?
• Maintaining order in the nation
• Giving people more say in important government decisions
• Fighting rising prices
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